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ALGERIA

NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER DISCUSSED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 30 Aug-5 Sep 78 pp 21-25

[Interview with Idriss Jazairi, assistant secretary general for international cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

[Text] The second session of the ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] of the United Nations ended on 5 August in Geneva on a note of no great cheer. Moreover, the questions to be taken up had been on its agenda since 1973. Thus there was hope for fruitful discussions, more firmly oriented toward action. If it is necessary to bow somewhat to the facts, one can only deplore the negative attitude of the Western powers, which would hardly listen to the language of dialog, agreement and cooperation, which seriously aggravated the tensions noted in international economic relations. To obtain an assessment of the vicissitudes this main UN body concerned with economic affairs has experienced and to establish the events underlying the world economic crisis, we made contact with the assistant secretary general for international cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Idriss Jazairi, who was kind enough to answer our questions.

[Question] The serious nature of the international economic crisis has been re-examined since the last session of the ECOSOC. What conclusions do you draw therefrom concerning the new international economic order?

[Answer] In fact, the world economic situation is so serious that all the participants in the second session of the ECOSOC for 1978 agreed to recognize it.

It is on the level of the nature of the crisis and its causes, however, where the differences continue to exist. For the leading Western countries, there is a preference for calling the situation a "difficult consequence of the effects of the 1974-75 recession," both with regard to the fact that the recovery noted in these countries in 1976 had exhausted itself by 1977, for example in the United States, where the rate of growth in the gross national product dropped from 6.1 percent in 1976 to 4.9 percent in 1977, and the fact that stagnation occurred in the course of that same year, as was the case with the EEC.

These circles like to stress the effects of the slowdown in the growth in the West on world trade, in which the rate of increase dropped from 11 percent in 1976 to 4 percent in 1977, drawing the conclusion therefrom that the best means of guaranteeing the health of the world economy is to safeguard the health of this privileged zone. It is true that the countries in the process of development are the first to be affected by the recessions in the rich countries. For example in 1977 the rate of increase in their exports was only 1/4 as strong as in 1976, while exports, in terms of volume, stagnated in the oil exporting countries, while the terms of trade curve for basic products dropped to match that for oil.

Moreover, the Third World countries, by maintaining imports at a high level, played a "locomotive" role in Western economic activity at the price of an increase in their indebtedness, which reached \$320 billion in 1979.

But the mechanisms for transmitting prosperity from the North to the South during the period of expansion did not work with equal efficiency.

The Scandinavian countries and Austria, stressing that the loss of current production due to idle capacity resulting from the recession in the rich countries would come to more than \$300 billion per year, proposed that the possibility of developing a program for non-inflationary stimulation of demand within the framework of a massive and multi-faceted transfer of resources toward the Third World be studied. This concept, opposed by the richest countries, merits deeper examination. However, the new international order should not come down to a mere improvement of the transmission mechanisms in the world economy.

Finally, the capitalist countries and the international bodies under their control are concerned about the upset in the balance of the payments and the inefficient operation of the processes of mutual adjustment in the balance of payments policies among the main world economic powers, while behind the manipulations of exchange rates, the Third World perceives and feels the problems in terms of deterioration of the terms of trade.

Finally, there is complaint in the northern hemisphere about the employment situation, underscoring the social problem posed by the existence of 17 million unemployed, and voices are being raised in justification of the need to introduce safeguards in the implementation of trade liberation policies. This is obviously a cautious manner of urging a return to protectionism, without saying so.

As to the causes of the present situation, the same circles further point to oil prices, without recognizing that the drop in real price terms (currently at a level below half of that for 1974) had an impact comparable to but in the opposite direction from that imputed to it during a period of rising prices. It is true that the lower oil prices drop, the higher the taxes levied by the Western countries on oil product prices become. This serves

to show that the drop was not economically justified, and that the "moderation" urged upon the producer countries in international circles in the name of joint responsibility for the management of the world economy is a one-way concept. It even serves as a pretext for an appropriation of oil sales by the developed importer countries. It should be noted in this context that while recourse by the Western countries to monetary stability zones in view of the depreciation of the dollar is seen as perfectly legitimate, the right of the oil producing countries to safeguard themselves against a drop in this same currency, in which almost the totality of their exports is payable, is challenged.

Among the other reasons, there are also protests in the capitalist countries against the export of products processed by the countries in the process of development, which have achieved notable penetration in certain limited sectors. As a result there is talk of limiting the access of these products to the markets in the richer countries, as if this were some sort of privilege, whereas with its 300 million unemployed, the Third World is acquiring 5 times as much from the developed world as it is selling to it.

On the other hand, certain developed countries insist on ignoring the main situational cause of the crisis in the 1970's, which is beyond any doubt the inaccurate estimates of demand in these countries and the unprecedented international liquidity increase in the course of the decade.

The countries in the process of development have insisted on asserting however that concerns of a situational nature should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that the crisis we are currently experiencing is but a manifestation of the unsuitability of world economic structures, and that the solution cannot be found in an effort, pure and simple, to integrate the low-income countries in the world economy.

Indeed their structures are not ossified, but are developing, and rapidly, but not in the desired direction. Have we not passed in just a few decades from merchant capitalism to the internationalization of the production process under the control of international firms, becoming a coupon-clipping oligopoly of knowledge? Confronted by these awesome dark forces, the countries in the process of development have turned to the ECOSOC and more recently to the conference of ministers of non-aligned countries in Belgrade on the matter of whether they could establish themselves as a counterweight.

The lack of any specific implementation of the major principles proclaimed at the sixth and seventh extraordinary sessions of the General Assembly makes it clear that it is not by dialog alone that one can put on notice the balance of forces of a basically feudal nature on the international level. Dialog can only consolidate the gains in the common struggle of the peoples of the Third World, not of course to replace one form of dependence with another more sophisticated one, but to strengthen their national and

collective autonomy, which some of the developed countries support only grudgingly, the better to avoid their obligations toward these peoples.

And so it is that at the current session of the ECOSOC, Algeria felt called upon to denounce the report by a committee of learned experts called the "Development Planning Committee" purporting that the development strategy for 1980 be based on a "dispersal" of the nations into a wide range of independent categories, each of which would have its own strategy. This proposal, based on a pseudoscientific approach, ill-conceals the underlying desire to promote division within the ranks of the countries of the Third World.

This having been said, I would be less than objective if I did not note a greater support, verbal of course, on the part of the developed countries in the ECOSOC when it comes to the concept of interdependence and the need for structural reforms in the world economy. However, the implications of this remain to be determined. That four years after the proclamation of the new international order, we are told that we are still seeking to achieve a better mutual understanding of the well-known problems, instead of jointly attacking the search for solutions--this does not augur well for international cooperation.

[Question] Again in connection with the authority of the plenary commission entrusted by the UN General Assembly with the task of launching dialog between the North and the South again, clear hindrances have been noted in the Western camp. What is the situation here exactly?

[Answer] Under the terms of Resolution 32/174, the plenary committee of the UN General Assembly has two main functions. On the one hand, there is supervision of the implementation of the decisions adopted within the framework of the implementation of the new order, as well as a study and exchange of views on the problems and priorities in the world economy, and on the other hand, it has the duty of negotiating to promote the resumption of the talks in progress and the settlement of the problems pending on the multi-lateral level.

Some developed countries have insisted on totally ignoring the second assignment of the committee in favor of the first. They wanted thereby to establish a framework which would be limited to allowing those responsible for the cooperation policies in the various countries to reach a better understanding of the overall economic problems, which in turn, they said, would make it possible to reach a consensus more easily on other levels. Other developed countries wanted the committee to content itself with serving as a simple preparatory committee for the extraordinary session of the General Assembly to be held in 1980, which would suspend until that time the implementation of any position which might have been adopted within it.

The Third World countries, for their part, believed that no one could be unfamiliar with the overall economic problems following the discussions which took place in the course of the sixth and seventh extraordinary sessions of the General Assembly and the CCEI. According to this thesis then, it falls to the committee to move the implementation of the new international economic order ahead, either by speeding up the implementation of the decisions adopted, or by seeking to resolve the problems on which it has not been possible to reach an agreement on other levels.

To this must be added a difference of opinion on the way in which the committee results should be given final expression. There are some who demand that the authority of the committee to make decisions be recognized, while others urge that mere summaries be issued by the president, binding none of the participants to any real commitment.

These differences as to procedure have appeared the more insurmountable since it has not been possible to note any basic progress on the first subject taken up, the "transfer of resources."

Thus it must be admitted that this meeting of the plenary committee has proved a deception.

Now the committee should pave the way for action. This, it would seem, is the basic point. It is a question of isolating the central points of focus for international cooperation as a function not so much of prospects for agreement as the strategic location of these points in the implementation of the new order. It would be desirable then to provide a political guideline on each of these points which would lead to a conceptual breakthrough, tracing the path along which practical solutions could be found.

The resumption on 4 September of the session adjourned in May following a blockage in the decision-making procedure will be of major importance, not only because it will allow progress to be made on the priority theme, the "transfer of resources," but also because it will safeguard the future of the committee itself. Moreover, we made use of the summer session of the ECOSOC, mainly focused on the problems of the plenary committee, to seek a solution, and it would seem without great success, which would safeguard that central body from paralysis in the North-South dialog. Thus it should fall to the committee to pass on to the General Assembly, in its first report to the 33rd session, the message expected of it, which should deal with the serious problems assailing mankind and not procedural details.

Perceived as being the forum in which the dialog between North and South should be pursued, the plenary committee occupies a central place in the United Nations system, without thereby replacing other negotiating bodies. Therefore, the positions adopted within it should not be lower in legal status than those of other inter-governmental bodies in the United Nations system, on pain of seriously prejudicing the prospects for dialog and

affecting the role and authority of the United Nations Organization itself. Otherwise, one can hardly see what interest there would be in summoning ministers or vice-ministers in charge of international cooperation from the capitals of all the nations in the world to meet three times a year. It will be possible to conclude from the position adopted in September whether in the final analysis the establishment of the committee will prove to have been in the minds of some yet another diversive maneuver to postpone the date of truly international negotiations.

[Question] Having followed the operations of the ECOSOC closely, we have the feeling that it is increasingly confining itself, in contradiction to the goals assigned it by the UN charter, revealing a certain lethargy.

[Answer] First of all, I believe that one can say that the ECOSOC is acting in contradiction to the goals assigned it by the charter.

That having been said, it must however be admitted that the council, which has very broad powers entrusted to it under the terms of Chapter X of the charter, has not been able to fulfill all its functions, in particular those set forth in Article 55, pertaining to the solution of international problems in the economic and social and public health sectors and other related problems.

This situation, which is not a new one, is the result of a number of factors, in particular the attitude of the developed countries toward the increase in the number of ECOSOC members.

Until 1965, the ECOSOC had only 18 members, and it was dominated by the developed countries, which were concerned with giving this body the maximum authority. The frustration of the countries in the process of development where this body was concerned was not therefore unrelated to the activities they pursued with a view to establishing the UNCTAD, which was more representative of the interests of the world as a whole.

In 1965 and again in 1973, the General Assembly increased the number of members of the council, on the initiative, quite obviously, of the Third World, to 27, and then 54. The Third World countries are currently seeking to enlarge the council again to include 75 members, a move opposed by the developed countries as a whole.

Having lost their preponderant powers within it, the Western countries are trying increasingly to limit the council to secondary tasks.

The other factors include:

--the profound differences and contradictions among the interests of the United Nations member states, which have blocked the whole of the negotiation process in the UN;

--the very structure of the council, its work methods, and the impressive proliferation of subsidiary bodies, sub-bodies and work groups;

--the level and sometimes the very quality of the representation within the council, and I think that this is the main lack;

--and, finally, the obvious lack of a political will which is at the very origins of the crisis of confidence currently being experienced by the United Nations Organization.

It would obviously take too long to analyze each of these aspects. For a number of months, the United Nations have been attempting to resolve their difficulties of a structural nature. One has the impression sometimes, moreover, that whenever international negotiations are blocked at the bottom, agreement is reached on the virtues of organic reorganizations which in such cases contribute little to the enhancement of the results of the work of the council in terms of the impact which a real political will to act would have. This is the more true since there are many who approach reorganization as a simple exercise in labor organization instead of conceiving of it as a political operation designed to translate the imperatives of the new international order into fact. This was moreover the spirit in which Resolution 32/197 of the Assembly on the reorganization of the economic and social sectors was adopted. This text recommends a series of measures designed to confer more consistency on the system, to rationalize its working methods and to make it more capable of assuming the functions which are its reason for being.

Where the recommendations pertaining to the economic and social council are concerned, it would be well to mention the main ones:

The need to establish a more succinct agenda, and one better oriented toward action;

Organization of thematic sessions leading to concrete results;

Reduction of the volume of documentation and improvement of its quality;

Limitation of the length of meetings;

Merger or elimination of certain subsidiary bodies;

Need to classify certain related or interdependent questions in groups in order to avoid duplication in debate;

Strengthening of the role of the regional economic commissions;

More active participation by the heads of specialized institutions in the discussion of questions within their competence, when such are studied by the ECOSOC; and

A more dynamic role for the president and the bureau of the ECOSOC in the organization of unofficial consultations with governments on thorny problems.

But it appears particularly difficult to put these recommendations into effect because of the complexity of the apparatus, and above all the habits acquired in the course of these recent years.

This is the place to recall that another interesting study on operational activities, better known as the "Jackson report," drafted at the request of the UNDP at the beginning of the present decade did not produce all the results hoped for earlier either.

In other words, the entire reorganization effort, if a political will clearly asserted by the industrialized countries does not underlie it, cannot by itself, by any means, untangle the current situation and make possible progress along the path to the establishment of the new international economic order.

Following the tremendous hope created in the Third World by the approval of the statement and the program of action for the establishment of the new international economic order, we have seen a counteroffensive on the part of the Western world to destroy that impetus and regain the ground lost.

The disillusioning results of the Paris conference on international economic cooperation, and the lack of any progress on the various levels of negotiation on the main questions which are the key to the rebalancing of international economic relations in a more just and equitable direction--all of this has an inevitable effect, in a direct and harmful fashion, on the work of the economic and social council.

Which is the same as saying that the lethargy of which you spoke is only a direct reflection of this situation.

What needs to be done is to bypass the current situation, characterized by ad hoc and piecemeal actions and by diversion to concepts having to do with the satisfaction of basic needs, to undertake instead an overall bold strategy from which all the countries will finally derive benefit, true as it is that the concept of interdependence is a concrete reality today more than ever.

It is in the happy conclusion of negotiations on the debt, the transfer of real resources to the countries in the process of development, the creation of a common fund for the stabilization of raw material prices, true industrial redeployment from the North toward the South, the increase of financial and technical transfers, and aid to promote food production in the Third World that the chances for a veritable resumption of the dialogue lie. And it is only on these conditions that the economic and social council can resume its place as a forum in which calm discussions will be undertaken for the development "of the conditions of stability and well-being necessary to guarantee peaceful and friendly relations among the nations based on respect for the principle of equality of rights," as the charter says.

NATION'S LONG-RANGE PLANS FOR SINAI REVIEWED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 21 Jul 78 pp 49-56

[Article: "The Sinai of the Future"]

[Text] Sinai and the Post-Victory Experiment

Sinai, the land of tourquoise and moon [stone], the holy valley and the route of the prophets, where Jabal al-Najwa is situated, is crowned with crescents of light. Sinai has been the forge of heroism since the dawn of history and over its soil the heroes of Egypt have set forth to defend the honor of the land. The Sinai of today is witnessing a giant surge of change. The empty yellow land has become clad in the verdure of life. Those who fled from it have returned to it with the comprehensive resurgence of development, tunnels have been dug to link it to the mother land, and Sinai has become part of the consciousness of every Egyptian--a precious piece of the nation's heart.

The awakening of Sinai came after the great October victory, and the leader and creator of the victory, Anwar al-Sadat, realized the great importance Sinai possesses from the point of view of location, resources, and man. The Sinai's area accounts for three times the area of the Delta and its population is close to a quarter million; as for resources, these are rich and numerous. Foremost among these are oil and minerals, in addition to the potential for agricultural expansion and its virgin land's contributions to achieving the revolution of self-sufficiency in food. In May 1974, a republican decree was issued incorporating the Governorate of Sinai into the units of local government and thus President al-Sadat ended the deadening isolation of this precious piece of Egypt's heart and translated his desire and love of this land into his statement "we must dig tunnels, even if with our fingertips, to reach into the depths of Sinai." After an invasion, victory radiated from the armies of Egypt in order to liberate Sinai from the Zionist enemy, and they crossed over to it, repeating the name of God and kissing its sands with enthusiasm and love. Then other detachments started crossing over to Sinai after the victory, supported

by engineers, technicians, doctors, teachers and workers from the Delta and the farthest reaches of Upper Egypt, building paved roads over the mountains and watercourses of the liberated territories, planting fruit, date and olive trees on its sands and dunes, and building tremendous tunnels under its ground and through our canal, with the arms of giants, drawing the returning, precious Sinai to us and breaking down the old curtain which loneliness and isolation had imposed upon it. Men, trucks, trains, cars, electricity and even the water of the Nile will flow through these tunnels, the first of which is the Martyr Ahmad Hamdi tunnel, in order to participate in imparting life to the thirsty yellow land. The detachments of reconstruction have built dwellings, schools, hospitals and villages and have built new paved roads in northern and southern Sinai. They have achieved magnificent accomplishments in order that life might pervade every square inch of this land. The detachments of development will soon be awaiting the signal to set forth into the heart of Sinai, when the soldiers of occupation evacuate all its territory and the moonscape is transformed into a paradise rippling with bounty and life.

Life Has Returned to the Ruins

During the Israeli aggression, the towns and villages of Sinai were exposed to the destruction and ruin of the installations that were within them, and road networks and water systems were wrecked. After the October victory, a start was made on implementing development projects, and, since the second separation of the forces, development projects have continued unabated, new model villages have been established, the installations in towns have been repaired, research has been conducted on mineral resources, agricultural testing stations have been restored and model farms annexed to them, the bedouins have started accepting the notion of permanent settlement in the new development areas, following the establishment of schools and hospitals and the laying of new water pipes, sanitary drainage, electric networks, mosques, social clubs and guard posts, and service centers have been built in the heart of the desert to care for the bedouins in these regions. Each center contains a health unit, a social unit, a police post, a primary school, an annex to the housing unit for all the workers in it, an administrative station and a water line.

The green face of liberated Sinai has started to become brighter. We saw it in Wadi Gharandal, the green oasis in the south, where the fertile watercourse lies between two mountains of sand and rock, and fruit trees, date palms, houses, bedouins' tents, flocks of sheep and goats and flocks of poultry are spread out over its land. The land of the valley is good for the cultivation of various crops in the form of corn, wheat, barley, onions, vegetables and fruit such as canteloupe, watermelons and oranges. In the north, there lies the first village to be built since the October victory, the Village of the Heroes in the central plain, where greenery spreads out over the sands and extends to encompass a big area; there the peasants have started to reap the fruits of their farming and are participating in the development of animal resources in the region. In the northern section,

there lies the al-Tanbah Plain, which is the most fertile arable area. This land may be transformed into productive fields once Nile water arrives. There are also fish resources in the north, represented by the output of Lake al-Bardawil, which is the source for the best kind of fish; the lake's area totals 100,000 feddans and its annual output totals 500 tons.

Tourism and the Treasures of the Mines

Tourism in Sinai will be a new source of investment, especially after its liberation is completed. There is the al-'Arish summer resort extending along the seacoast for a distance of almost 30 kilometers, which makes it stand alone among summer resorts in the world with its tranquil blue coast, its soft sands and the green orchards of date palms. There are other enchanting coasts in Sinai which are still virgin and on which man has not ventured, between al-'Arish and Rafah and Lake al-Bardawil in the north and, in the south, in the region between the estuary at Abu Rudays, where Musa's Wells and its museum, which tells of the Egyptian soldier's victory over the most powerful fortresses of the enemy, are situated, and the sulphurous Pharaoh's Bath, which is considered a marvel within the mountain, below which flow the wells of warm sulphurous water debouching into the Gulf of Suez and above which rises steam in a wonderful, splendid form. There are also Mount Musa, Saint Catherine's Monastery and the other Pharaonic antiquities. Sinai is replete with treasures of magic and beauty which will attract tourists to it from all the countries of the world.

Sinai is also considered one of our most important sources of oil. One hundred fifty /kilo/ meters south of Suez lies the most important oil area in Sinai, Abu Rudays, where more than 1,000 Egyptian workers and engineers are now working to produce the oil we were deprived of during the past 10 years, and which, with the fields of Qubrun, Sudr, Bala'im offshore and onshore and Ra's Jarrah, represented. The original reserves latent in these fields are estimated at more than 70 million barrels /sic/ and on 1 December 1975 these fields were liberated. In the midst of the most difficult circumstances and land surrounded with the danger of mines, our men immediately started to return everything to its natural condition, and in 2 years a revenue of \$500 million was realized from these fields and production reached 70,000 barrels a day; it will reach 100,000 barrels a day in 1980. At the same time, drilling is underway to realize new discoveries. Another fruit of the October victory has been the return of the manganese mines in Abu Zanimah, and new coalfields have been discovered.

The Fighting Governor and the Land of the Future

Perhaps it is part of Sinai's good luck that its governor is one of the heroes of the October war. He is Maj Gen Ibrahim Fu'ad Nassar. The man is behind every project and successful leap this region is witnessing. The governor of Sinai says:

"In my estimation, the reconstruction of Sinai is a step whose success is guaranteed. It is a white page on which sound scientific planning for the

sake of building an integrated society will succeed. It has been my first objective to eliminate the quality of transience from this society. The Bedouin has a moving objective, and for him to settle down it is necessary that he be furnished his requirements at the place he chooses and that services, such as schools, utilities and housing, be made available. This is what we have achieved after building the integrated desert service units. In addition, five new villages have been built in the liberated areas. At the same time, we have made plans to increase the income of the citizen in Sinai and to exploit the resources of each region. The villages on the north coast, for example, can rely on fishing as a resource for livelihood, and we have built a cooperative society for fishermen and also for quail hunting. In the agricultural field, 4,000 date palms have been planted whose output is estimated at 1.5 million kilograms of dates, and we will establish a factory for date-palm products. We have drilled 80 wells and started introducing seedlings suited for this region, especially olive trees and citrus. At the same time we have encouraged families to increase their incomes through the productive families project and the distribution of sewing machines to each housewife.

"In the field of mineral resources, scientific agencies have started their activity of exploring for the resources existing in the liberated areas and prospecting for new water sources. Participating in this research is the Desert Institute at Wadi Sudr, and preliminary investigation has established that there is water enough to irrigate 35,000 feddans. Research is also underway to select new non-traditional crops. Model farms have been prepared for fruit and vegetables. The Agricultural Development Authority and the Canal University are participating in preparing new agricultural research, especially medicinal herbs, on account of their great economic yield and the suitability of the soil for their cultivation. A farm has been prepared for this purpose which is 40 feddans in area and the young people in the Faculty of Agriculture of the Canal University have participated in these experiments. Cooperative and agricultural societies have been built to serve the peasant."

The governor added that the isolation of Sinai, imposed by circumstances, has ended, especially with the excavation of the tunnels and the settling of the inhabitants, and there is the new resurgence represented by the new oil discoveries. A new Deminex company field has been discovered on the eastern coast, producing 45,000 barrels a day, and drilling is going on in more than one area. A system of new roads is being built to link up the north and south of Sinai. The governor of Sinai, Maj Gen Ibrahim Fu'ad Nassar, added that there is a new image of Sinai, Sinai the green, with its mineral, oil and tourist resources. The people of Sinai today enjoy complete care, are more closely linked to their nation and their land, and will never allow aggressors to try to invade them. Today we expect that the rest of its land will be liberated so that they may participate in planting life, love and peace on every square inch of it.

The Ministry of Reclamation Is Immediately Starting To Rebuild Sinai

Starting with the dawn of the 23 July revolution, the Ministry of Land Reclamation, representing the development of the desert and the development of land, began to study and carry out land reclamation projects on a broad scope east and west of the Suez Canal on groundwater, rainwater, and the waters of the great Nile with the objective of linking Sinai to the territories of the republic. The correctness of our policy and the deviousness of the enemy became apparent in the tyrannical aggression of 1967, when the noble, conscientious work stopped. Then the war of October 1973 brought victory, and our devout president Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat decided to open the canal as a bounty to Egypt, Arabhood and world prosperity. He gave the signal for the green revolution and the Ministry of Land Reclamation, with its various agencies, made a running start in resuming work on any in-depth study of water resources and arable land area. Reclamation and farming began on an area of 20,000 feddans of Nile water, through a culvert across the Suez Canal.

We are not spreading about secrets when we say that the Sinai development plan is ready and will begin immediately, as one of the fruits of the peace initiative.

Such main areas of the Sinai as the northern coast, the Wadi al-'Arish basin, the Gulf of al-'Aqabah area, and the Suez Gulf area are rich in rain and groundwater, and preparation is being made to pipe in Nile water through tunnels and culverts.

On the north coast there is the al-Tina /sic/ plain and environs, greater in area, and a study has been made on more than 40,000 feddans in Wadi al-'Arish. On the Gulf of al-'Aqabah lands, a study has been made of areas exceeding 9,000 feddans and a study is underway on other areas, including 33,000 feddans in the al-Shaykh Zuwayd area, of which more than 4,700 feddans have been planted with almonds and grapes.

The comprehensive development plan up to the year 2000 will achieve a green revolution and firm intercommunication between the Sinai and the Nile Valley. It will accelerate the development of the perseverant people, will help the living standard of people working in mining and oil, and will raise the banner of civilization over the eastern gate of Egypt, God willing.

So That Egypt's Hope of Producing 1 Million Barrels of Oil in 1980 May Be Realized

In the new Sinai, the Sinai of the glorious October, the Sinai of victory and the crossing, there is an oasis of plenty, an oasis of wealth in the south--the Bala'im Oil Company. The Egyptian oil giants have returned in order to restore the cycle of life to it again, building roads over the

rocks and in the bowels of the earth as a symbol of Egyptian will, achieving every day a new sacrifice of which Egyptian man may be proud and on which he may inscribe the pages of his radiance and might.

In the framework of planning for development, construction and reconstruction, our country is taking positive steps to develop the economic resources to build a new society. Oil is the most important natural resource of Egypt and the government has therefore directed its attention to increasing oil output, refining, processing, transportation and storage. The direct result of this attention has been the fact that the oil industry has made ambitious progress and that national revenue from oil has increased constantly. This revenue totalled 12 million pounds in 1952, rose to 24 million in 1960, and has continued to rise. After the establishment of the blessed Corrective Revolution on 15 May 1971, which President Anwar al-Sadat led in order to correct the revolutionary course and establish a society of dignity and prosperity for Egyptian man, attention to the oil industry has been one of the positive phenomena of economic development and the attainment of prosperity.

As a result of this attention, oil production increased greatly, new oil fields were discovered, and the volume of reserves increased. The oil sector's plan was aimed at self-sufficiency in oil products by increasing refining capacity, establishing petrochemicals industries and producing lubricating oils in addition to providing, transporting and storing these products by laying pipelines and increasing storage capacities.

In this manner oil began to participate in the attainment of welfare for our people and it is drawing up an ambitious plan to increase daily output levels so that, with God's permission, these may reach 1 million barrels per day in 1980.

The government of the Corrective Revolution, aiming at a new revolution in industrialization policy and in planning for the industrial resurgence of the country, has modified the General Petroleum Authority Law in order to encourage public and private capital to participate in the realm of oil exploration and attain an output of 1 million barrels a day. This modification of the law has been an important incentive for domestic and foreign companies to participate in the sphere of oil exploration on equitable terms which will bring the major share of the profit to the country.

The Fruits of Oil Ambitions

The first fruit of the oil ambitions in Egypt was the Eastern Petroleum Company, which was formed in 1957 with a capital of 100,000 pounds as a result of fruitful cooperation between domestic and foreign capital. The capital proceeded to rise to 16 million pounds. Through this success, the Eastern Petroleum Company was the exemplary model, in application, of cooperation and equitable participation between the domestic party and the Italian party in our country. This cooperation resulted in exploration through oil drilling activities on the Gulf of Suez floor, and this resulted in the

discovery of the first offshore field in the history of the Egyptian oil industry, the Bala'im offshore field. On this account, company officials considered it appropriate to call it the Bala'im Oil Company.

Since the day the company was established, all its workers have rallied to exert efforts and persevere in order to attain the hope that everyone has agreed to achieve, which is to double production. The fruit of this effort was the extension of the company's fields in the Sinai Peninsula and the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, from Abu Zanimah in the north to Ra's Jarrah, south of al-Tur, over an area of 2,781 square kilometers. These fields are:

The Abu Rudays and Sudr fields.

The Wadi Firan field.

The Bala'im onshore field.

The Bala'im offshore field.

The Ra's Jarrah field south of al-Tur.

An Oasis of Riches in Sinai

The areas of Sinai territory where the Bala'im Oil Company is operating are considered a real oasis of wealth and plenty, to which all the tourists and citizens who pass over the territory of Sinai because of, the extensive resources of civilization they comprise. These areas are:

A camp to lodge workers at the worksite.

A club and "mess" for workers, offering food at the company's expense.

A hospital with all equipment, outfitted in a modern fashion to offer full medical service.

An indoor and outdoor movie house.

Soccer fields and basketball and tennis courts.

An ice plant and coolers for food.

An administration center for the fields, a training center, and an industrial area comprising workshops equipped with machinery and equipment needed for maintaining drilling and production equipment and heavy and light transportation equipment, erecting facilities and storing spare parts and accessories. This is considered the only industrial center in the Sinai Peninsula.

This integrated industrial center contains a garage, a lubricating and service center, a diesel motor maintenance shop, an oxygen and arc welding

shop, a machine shop, an electric shop, a shop for maintaining crude oil lifting pumps, a plant to produce electric power for the town of Abu Rudays and another in the field area, a carpentry shop, two docks for drilling and production equipment, equipment storehouses, technical laboratories for chemical and biological matters, and a telecommunications building.

The October Victory Struggle and Its Results

One of the fruits of the triumphant October struggle, indeed one of the most prominent fruits of the glorious October war, was the restoration to the Bala'im Oil Company of its fields in the liberated area of Sinai. The force of workers in the company was redoubled again in order to achieve the desire which everyone had agreed upon, which was to increase production, even though the Israeli enemy left the fields in the worst condition ever, as a result of the lack of maintenance in onshore and offshore production facilities, in addition to his inclination to conduct sabotage and to loot when compelled to withdraw from the area. This sabotage and looting represents the bad condition the fields were in when they were handed over:

The Israeli enemy did not leave behind the drilling rigs or well maintenance units which the company owned before the aggression. Those which were to be found when the field was handed over were in extremely bad condition.

A lack of equipment and machinery required for artificial life.

The necessary onshore and offshore production and crude treatment stations were threatened with total breakdown.

Offshore equipment, units required to service offshore production and deep-water equipment absolutely did not exist.

A lack of passenger vehicles and the delapidation of heavy transport equipment and cranes to the point where they constituted a danger to production units.

The failure to leave behind the necessary technical documents, such as the study of operating conditions in the fields, even though the Israeli enemy took over the company's fields in 1967 when they were in a state of natural flow, full well maintenance, and operating conditions supported by carefully studied technical rates accompanied by oil reservoir behavior, and all fields were backed up by all means of production in the form of roads and integrated facilities for technical services, maintenance, technical training, studies and research.

The Company Regained Its Fields

No sooner had the company regained its fields, following the crossing and the liberation of Sinai, than it managed to achieve the production rates required by the government's estimated budget, in spite of its modest

resources when delivery took place, through the consolidation of its workers' efforts. In 1976 the company's actual output came to about 23,474,486 barrels of crude, an increase of 12 percent over the plan envisaged, which was 20,483,126 barrels per year for the same year.

In 1976 some studies were carried out on one of the oil-producing formations in the offshore fields; these studies yielded up information to the effect that oil reservoir behavior in the offshore wells gives an index which surpasses the production rates which had been previously predicted for them, and this made it inevitable that detailed technical studies would have to be completed on all oil-bearing formations onshore and offshore. The company therefore decided on more geological and geophysical research in its permit areas in the Bala'im offshore and onshore and Abu Rudays fields. The conclusion of these studies was beneficial to the company, while requiring that it allow in its budget for the year 1977-78 for the drilling of a number of onshore and offshore wells, in the hope that a new discovery would be achieved through its program, by which the company would contribute a modest share to our national economy.

Projects Carried out in 1976

The most important projects which took place in 1976--most of which concerned replacement and revovation to maintain the production envisaged--are:

Installation of the production and maintenance platform F-10 to maintain and rework four offshore producing wells which were destroyed during the glorious October war, so that offshore oil production may increase by 12,000 barrels a day.

Full maintenance of electric power units in the Bala'im and Abu Rudays camp stations, increasing capacity to 6,380 horsepower, and installing an HM turbine unit to function as a reserve station for the basic ones in case they break down.

Extension of a 600-meter marine line 4 inches in diameter in the Wadi Firan harbor to receive the fuel required to operate the fields and replacement of 15 kilometers of production pipe.

An ocean floor survey under the F-10 platform, a 12-inch marine line connecting the main platforms to the land, and a 24-inch loading line in the Wadi Firan port, by means of the submarine Intercep.


Outfitting and renewed operation of light and intermediate well maintenance units. Two hundred forty-nine well-maintenance operations were actually carried out by these units in 1976.

Contracting to lease a marine unit equipped with a marine crane to perform the necessary offshore installation and erection for offshore well repair work and completion of parts of the electric power units needed for the artificial lift project in offshore wells.


\$20 Million for New Projects

The costs of completing current and future Bala'im Oil Company projects are estimated at about \$20 million. These projects include the money being directed to raising productive capacity to 100,000 barrels per day, more than doubling electric power capacity used in production, drilling discovery and development wells, maintaining the entire offshore production system, raising the onshore and offshore output storage capacity, increasing the capacity of the pumping stations in Wadi Firan, preventing the pollution of Egyptian coasts and waters by refuse from oil tankers, constructing new piers, and other supplementary projects.


What one is entitled to feel proud about is that the Bala'im Oil Company's crude oil output in 1953 did not exceed 6,514 barrels a year. This production developed and increased over the years until in 1976 it reached 470,396,453 barrels per year /sic/.




[Photo on p 52, caption not given]



The most modern new facilities in the Bala'im Oil Company fields. These were completed in a short period after they were rebuilt and the Egyptian administration received them.



Massive oil tanks owned by Bala'im Oil Company, following their expansion to accommodate all storage




Marine production platform at Bala'im Offshore, on which work has been resumed by Egyptian experts and workers















The largest and most modern electric power generating plant, which will move the wheels of production forward in the Bala'im Oil Company fields and increase new and future projects

Egyptian General Geological Survey and Mining Projects Authority:
Mineral Ores in the Governorate of Sinai



[Key on following page]

Key:

-  Areas of manganese mining (Umm Yahya and surrounding area).
-  Gypsum mining areas (Ra's Mal'ab).
-  Kaolin mining areas (Wadi Burah, Abu Natsh and Farsh al-Ghazalat).
-  White clay mining areas (Masba' Salamah).
-  White sand mining areas (southern quarries).
-  Mud and limestone mining areas (Abu Zanimah) (the mud is required by oil companies and the quarries are for construction activities in Abu Zanimah and Abu Rudays).
-  Sand and gravel mining areas (Abu Zanimah in the No 2 Quarries) (for construction activities in the Abu Zanimah and Abu Rudays areas).
-  Tourquoise mining areas (the Jabal al-Mugharah mines).
-  Coal mining project areas (al-Mugharah).
-  Manganese prospecting areas (Ra's Umm as-Sadd, Nabaq Marsus, Sharm al-Miyah, Wadi Khashabah, and Jabal al-Safra').
-  Copper prospecting areas (Wadi Kayd, Wadi Samra, Samarra' al-Mu'askar, Abu Thawr, Tarfa, al-Ruqaytah, al-Rahbah, Firan and Abu Suwayrah).
-  Sulphur prospecting areas (Abu Durriyah).

Geomorphological units:

1. Basement rock massif in the southern triangle.
2. Plateau area in central Sinai.
3. Complex fold area in northern Sinai.
4. Northern coastal region.
5. The Suez Gulf ridge area.

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IRAN

RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO SHAH GAINING MOMENTUM

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 26 Aug-1 Sep 78 p 40

[Article: "The Bloody Chess Game in Iran; Religious Opposition Corners Shah"]

[Text] The religious atmosphere of the blessed month of Ramadan is spreading religious fervor over the holy war declared by the Shi'ite religious scholars in Iran to overthrow the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (58 years old).

Showers of gunfire and tear gas bombs no longer frighten the masses as they leave the mosques on the days of the fast in defiance of army orders imposing a curfew and forbidding demonstrations. Resounding shots are mixed with the jeers of demonstrators against the Shah and his regime. When soldiers succeed in breaking up the demonstrators, [the latter] distribute themselves in small groups that begin by venting their anger against scores of establishments and buildings that are owned by the ruling family and its aides who belong to the small Baha'i sect. The Shi'ites harbor much hostility towards the Baha'is because they consider them to be heretics whose religious position in occupied Palestine places them under suspicion of cooperating with international Zionism.

Almost a year has gone by since the outbreak of the disturbances in Iran. In the last few weeks these disturbances have been occurring more frequently; they have become prevalent from one end of the country to the other, spreading from Tabriz in the extreme north to Qum and Isfahan in the extreme south.

Disturbances Reach Tehran

Even in Tehran, the imperial capital, army forces had to surround the old market place where merchants had closed their shops in compliance with the strike that was called on 16 August to commemorate the Martyrs of Isfahan Day.

Although the casualties and the wounded have so far been in the hundreds and although thousands have been detained, the religious opposition and the national front which include a new generation of liberal leaders and

intellectuals have proven their absolute control over the mainstream in Iran. Handbills carrying statements by Shi'ite leaders, chief among whom is Ayatullah Khomeini who has been in exile for 15 years, are almost openly distributed.

Recent issues of these handbills and statements made therein have proclaimed their hostility to the Shah more openly and publicly. A handbill that was being circulated in Tehran on 14 August in the name of the religious leader Khomeini stated, "As long as this criminal race remains in power, the horrors, the difficulties and the tragedies will endure. 'Death to the Shah' has become a national slogan and it will remain a national slogan until this unfair regime is completely annihilated."

After warning the people against becoming distracted by the Shah's promises which he makes to alleviate [the effect] of his autocratic government, the statement calls upon the masses to rally around its leaders. It also calls upon the scholars to harness the people's energies for the purpose of achieving "the goals."

An Organized Opposition Movement

The religious opposition has proven that not only does it control the mainstream [in Iran], but that it can also organize and coordinate popular action in spite of martial law and of thousands of SAVAK agents who are led by officers trained by the Central Intelligence Agency which supplied them with the most modern electronic espionage and torture equipment.

The religious opposition is asking for a democratic constitutional government whose principles are derived from the rules of religion. It is asking that governmental administration be purged of corruption and that public freedoms be uninhibited.

On the other side the Shah is relying on his armed forces and his intelligence agencies to confront the people's actions. The armed forces have so far proven their absolute loyalty to him via their bloody suppression of demonstrations and disturbances. Observers do not think it unlikely that these forces will maintain their loyalty to the Shah especially since senior army officers had been reared on the principle of absolute personal loyalty to the Shah and to the throne.

The Shah's Tactical Errors

But it seems that the Shah's regime committed tactical errors in confronting the religious and political opposition. It was the media that began attacking religious scholars and provoking their religious sensibilities by accusing them of opposing the Shah's reforms and revolutionary plans for liberating women and distributing the land. It was the media that portrayed Islam as a reactionary religion dissenting from the spirit of the age. In all his statements to the foreign press the Shah continued to harp on this tune to win their sympathy and to show himself as the modern, democratic reformer.

But the regime did not stop there; it gave its supporters and its agents in SAVAK free reign to obstruct religious and popular processions and celebrations in mosques and in the homes of religious scholars. When the masses initially expressed their opposition to these measures, policemen and security men shot them and shed their blood with extreme cruelty that cannot be justified.

When the fury of the masses exploded, the Shah proceeded to offer political concessions that made him appear hesitant and fearful. At the same time his promises that he would hold elections the following year that would be 100 percent free and that he would remove restrictions on public freedoms and establish constitutional organizations were received with obvious listlessness. This is because Iranian public opinion cannot believe that a man who ruled the country for 25 years with an iron fist can turn into a democratic ruler overnight.

Some of the Shah's advisers are blaming U.S. President Carter and his human rights campaign [for the disturbances in Iran]. They are saying that it is idealistic slogans that encouraged moderates in Iran to move against a regime that is an ally of the United States. The human rights banner was then moved quickly from the hands of moderates and intellectuals to those of Moslem Marxists.


Although the Shah's assistants are always careful in their statements to assert that the regime does still have matters in the country under control, the Shah's media campaigns in the western press against his opponents from the extreme right to the extreme left and the charges he makes against international Marxism one time and against Palestinians another time show the extent to which his regime is isolated from support by any real political power in the country. These campaigns and charges show the extent of his confusion, his anxiety and his fumbling about under these serious circumstances.

The Shah's Cards Are in Washington's Hands

Unless Washington is fully convinced that the Shah's survival has become a threat to U.S. and western interests in the area, it would be a mistake to predict that the current popular explosion will lead to his overthrow.

It is, therefore, not unlikely that Washington would resort to making a superficial change in the government to dispel the resentment and to appease the Shi'ite religious scholars especially if matters were to take a turn to the worse and the resentment were to turn from the Shah to the United States which supports him. The recent attack against the Khan Salar restaurant in Tehran, which is frequented by Americans some of whom were wounded [during the attack], may suggest that the religious and liberal opposition is beginning to feel strongly disappointed over Washington's hesitation or rather its support for the Shah. The evidence for this lies in the silence that has settled over the U.S. media regarding events in Iran and the deliberate news blackout on the popular actions against the man who heads this regime.

The religious opposition in Iran has completed a major phase of the political chess game in the country. It can no longer retreat from its encirclement of the Shah because any retreat on its part would enable the regime to carry out a series of bloody liquidations similar to those it did carry out in the fifties and the sixties. And thus the bloody series of events will continue to take place on the white and black squares of the Iranian chess board until the last decisive moment.



Ayatullah Khomeini is calling for the overthrow of the Shah



The Shah with an American body guard to his right

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ISRAEL

INCREASED TERRORIST ATTACKS REPORTED

Tel Aviv HA'AREZ in Hebrew 30 Aug 78 p 9

[Article by Ze'ev Shif: "Terrorists Have Smuggled Large Amounts of Explosives for Their Recent Wave of Attacks"]

[Text] In recent weeks we have witnessed a wave of terrorist attacks. True, most of them failed--thanks to the alertness of the public--but the attacks showed a most concentrated effort on the part of the Palestinian organizations. There were days when a number of bombs were discovered in a number of sites in Israel. Within 3-4 weeks there was an average of 1.5 bombs every 2 days; some were discovered, some were actually detonated. The terrorists achieved very little in this wave, but it does show their ability to sustain a relatively prolonged effort of attacks. This is not a sophisticated wave (such as were the attacks of the Jewish underground in Palestine on centers of British rule, attacks that were accompanied by frontal assaults), but attacks on individuals in public places. At the same time it shows progress and improvement.

The concentrated effort of the terrorists ties in with a specific date and event--the Camp David summit meeting.

In the past, too, there were special "dates" when the terrorists wanted to cause "waves" of attacks, but, with the exception of sporadic ones they did not succeed. This fact brings us to one of the most important points in the last wave. The nature of this wave shows that this is, perhaps, the first time that the terrorists active in Israel and in the territories have a sufficiently large amount of various explosives in order to undertake a concentrated effort.

The problem of the terrorists within Israeli borders has never been a lack of people, but a lack of ammunition and equipment (as well as organization and planning). Israeli security forces were able, in the past, to secure the borders quite well. In spite of the open bridges and movement of people from the Arab countries to the territories, the terrorists had difficulties acquiring explosives, detonators and other equipment. Occasionally

there were attempts (as per directions given over Arab radio stations) to produce home-made bombs from chemicals acquired for other purposes. Many times terrorists used duds (mostly bazookas) that were carelessly left behind by training IDF units or units of the Jordanian army. All this had its effect on the ability and achievement level of the terrorist groups.

The change is that nowadays it seems or it seemed so the last time, that the terrorists in the territories seem to have considerable quantities of explosives and related equipment.

The conclusion is that they have succeeded in smuggling from outside the borders large amounts of materiel (only recently Qiryat Arbai was shelled). In the past they used Haifa as their entry point. Various pieces of equipment, in which explosives were hidden, were sent from Cyprus via Haifa. This is the equipment currently used. This was discovered and the suspects admitted to the truth. It is not unlikely that a similar route exists today. In any event, this is one success of the terrorists.

Our defense system set out to foil these attempts. Inspection in some places was intensified. It is known that in the past the terrorist organizations tried to smuggle weapons in the Jordan and the Dead Sea areas.

Departmentalized Terrorism

The degree to which attacks are carried out successfully is a question in itself. Most of the explosives were discovered thanks to the alertness of the Israeli public (including minorities). The technical details of putting the explosives together were not published. It is generally not done in order not to give the terrorists any food for thought. If there has been any marked improvement it is in the clandestine organization. Secrecy has increased. In other words, the organizations have departmentalized. Every group knows about itself only, its department only, and has no knowledge of other cells and units. More than 10 years have passed since the terrorists succeeded in departmentalizing their organization in the territories. Individuals now know less about the activities of others.

But even this development in clandestine organization does not constitute an unsurmountable challenge for our security forces. Even before they spread a complex intelligence net over the territories. It is only a matter of time. In the end they manage to uncover most details of terrorist activities, including names. They manage to uncover most clandestine organizations, break them and arrest those who did not manage to flee. The percentage of exposure is tremendous, considering the nature of the war and the fact that we are dealing with two populations.

While organizational changes are mentioned, another typical fact should be pointed out. As in the past--and we have observed it with Arab armies in the past--with the terrorist organizations, too, the commanders stay behind. Only the privates are present and active in the front line.

Driving out Terrorists

This is probably one of the reasons why in 11 years of Israeli rule over such a large Palestinian population that claims to be under an occupying force, the Palestinians have not been able to carry on a guerilla war, or even a terrorist war worthy of its name. This, in spite of the fact that they do not lack manpower or money, that they enjoy the support of neighboring countries and that there is a constant flow of people from the Arab countries, via the open bridges, both into the territories and into Israel proper. Even the recent wave of terrorist attacks is not much of anything, considering the basic means at the terrorists' disposal.

In spite of the success of our defense forces we cannot ignore the fact that the terrorists do not lack manpower for new candidates and recruits. New cells are formed to replace those uncovered. Jails are full and those who are released are constantly replaced by others. This shows that either there is a high motivation within the population to join the terrorist organizations or that punitive measures are not a sufficient deterrent, or both. The question of punishment goes beyond the problem of the death penalty for murderers, because we are dealing with punishing and deterring large groups, not just those caught murdering civilians. The question that has come up in this context is whether or not those about to be released or those who have served most of their term should be exiled. The idea is to send them to neighboring countries, such as Lebanon. Israel used this method in the past when people were exiled to Jordan. Even Jordan, although it was considered quiet in comparison with Lebanon, was deemed a bad punishment for people from the territories.

Those who are banished obviously cannot come back, and they pose much less of a threat from outside.

Terrorism outside of Israel has not been touched upon in this article, although it is clear that the present wave will find its way to activities outside of the Middle East. The effort is a joint affair and there is information that the terrorists intend to be active on both fronts. Overseas the main talk concerns two groups: The Popular Front of George Habbash and Wadi Haddad's organization, the prominent figure of which is Haddad's niece, Su'ad Haddad, in whose hands Haddad placed the financial secrets of his organization just prior to his death. War overseas is more difficult although police forces in western countries, including Great Britain, closely cooperate with Israel in combatting Arab terror. This war will not come to an end when the Camp David summit is over. It will go on, even if there is an agreement in Camp David, even if some sort of autonomy for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is decided upon tomorrow.

FIGHT OF BEDOUINS FOR THEIR LANDS IN NEGEV DESERT OUTLINED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 10 Jul 78 pp 20-23

[Article: "Al-Naqb Bedouins Battle Israeli Authorities; Israelis Use Ottoman Law to Deprive Bedouins of Their Lands; Bedouins Rejected Arbitration Committee Resolutions, Refused to Be Resettled in New Villages and Stood Fast in Face of Eviction Attempts; Even Torah Says We Were Here Before Jews and We Will Stay on This Land in Spite of Everybody"]

[Text] In the past few months AL-DUSTUR has focused attention more than once on the problem of the bedouin Arabs living under Israeli occupation, on the Zionist authorities' attempts to oust them from their lands and pastures and to liquidate their herds, and on how these bedouins, most of whom live in the al-Naqb area, have tried to fight the terrorist means used against them by the Zionist occupation authorities. This problem has also drawn the attention of the world press, which has given this issue broad coverage and which has been unanimous in accusing the Zionist occupation authorities of pursuing premeditated plans to oust the bedouin Arabs from the lands and pastures on which they have lived for hundreds of years. In this issue AL-DUSTUR publishes an exclusive report on the problem which it has received from the occupied territories and which recounts the tragedy of these bedouins under the shadow of the Zionist occupation.

Occupied Territories--Exclusive AL-DUSTUR Report--Jum'ah al-'Azazimah was drinking coffee and talking to his family one morning when he saw dust rise in the distance. Moments later, six Israeli military jeeps and three trucks approached his tent. When the vehicles stopped near his tent, Jum'ah noticed that they belonged to the Israeli police, the border guard and the "Green Patrols."

Recounting the details of what happened, Jum'ah said: "The police came and took me, along with my young brother, away from the tent and told us not to move. Suddenly, the occupants of the military vehicles jumped from their cars and headed for the tents, cut off the ropes, loaded the tents in the trucks and took the mattresses, blankets and house utensils and threw them into the trucks. Despite this, we did not leave the place but stayed to guard our herds. At night we slept on the ground without any blankets. We all did this, even the little children."

At this point one of Jum'ah's relatives interposed: "I have lived on this land for 18 years. Before this we lived in another place, but the Israeli army ordered us to move here. Finally I brought a tractor and plowed and cultivated this land. I planted these trees with my own hands. However, David and Shlomo came with policemen, dismantled our tents and told us that if they find us in this place when they return in 14 days they will take us somewhere that nobody knows."

Continuing the story, Hasan al-Ghanimi said: "I have two wives, five sons and four daughters. Yesterday morning I also had a tent, blankets and a mattress in which I kept my wives' gold. Today I possess nothing. I had wheat sacks, cooking utensils, tea and sugar, and now I have nothing at all. They confiscated even the tea kettles. They loaded everything in a truck and drove away. Where? Only God knows."

Recounting what happened to him, Sulayman Hasan, from the Abu Quraynat tribe, said: "Look how beautiful is this orchard I own. Look how beautiful are the fig and almond trees. I also had a tin shack in which I lived with my wife and my three little children. However, I demolished the shack with my own hands, because the judge in Bi'r al-Sab' (Beersheba) Court said that the shack was not licensed. This is why I brought down the shack and why we moved to this tent. I work in the phosphate [mines] in (Oron). I leave the tent at 0500 and return at 1700. One day I returned from work but could not see the tent. I was surprised. Where did the tent disappear? When I moved closer, I found my wife and children crying. I asked them: What has happened to you? Where is our tent? My wife said: Evil Jewish men came in cars and took away everything. Where to? I don't know."

This is how the "green patrols," which are controlled by Gen Arik Sharon, the Israeli minister of agriculture, act toward the bedouins of al-Naqb these days. These powerless Arabs, whose property has been gradually confiscated by the Israeli occupation authorities, have been prevented by Israeli law from building modern houses. This is why they have been forced to build tin shacks that are unhealthy to live in, especially in a hot area such as the al-Naqb area. Despite this, the Israeli authorities recently decided to eliminate the tin shacks, as well as tents, under the pretext of "developing al-Naqb."

Children as Hostages

The tragic stories concerning the al-Naqb bedouins continue. One of these is the story recounted by 'Id Salim al-Ghanman, who belongs to Shaykh Salman Zannun's group--a story that is both very cruel and bitter at the same time. "Id Salim al-Ghanmah said: "One morning Shlomo's jeep from the green patrol arrived. I had known Shlomo before. Still, he grabbed my Son Isma'il and dragged him to the jeep. My wife said to him: This is my son; where are you taking him? He said to her: Tell me where your house is and I will return the boy to you. The wife said: We have no

house. We are shepherds, and we always live with our herds. Shlomo said to her: Tell me where your house is or I will kill the boy. The wife said: Take everything we have. Take the sheep, but let the boy alone. But Shlomo took the boy to the jeep, and my wife ran after the car for 3 kilometers. Suddenly, the jeep stopped and Shlomo threw a grenade among the sheep, and my wife thought that all the herd would be killed. But the grenade was only a smoke bomb which left behind just a thick smokescreen. Shlomo then fired a single bullet, and my wife thought that her son had been killed and began crying and wailing like a madwoman. At that point Shlomo left the area quickly. In the evening they brought the child back to us."

Recounting what happened, the son said: "I was very afraid. I did not know what would be done to me. He [Shlomo] fired the bullet close to my head. When I asked him to return me to my family, he laughed and said that he would do so only if I led him to our tent. I swore to him that we have no tent and that we always live with the herds."

Last April the "green patrols," the policemen, the border guards and officials of the Ministry of Interior and the Israeli Land Administration came and demolished 8 houses and 12 shacks and confiscated 25 tents, leaving behind more than 300 homeless women, children and men from the Abu Quraynat, al-A'sam and al-'Azazimah clans. The Israeli Government's justification for these brutal acts is that Israel needs 26,600 dunums to build military plants, despite the fact that Israel has confiscated and has come to control vast areas of land in al-Naqb in recent years.

However, these stories describe only a small part of the persecution to which the bedouins are subjected. Some of the stories are published by the Israeli papers, particularly by HA'AREZ, MA'ARIV, YEDI'OT AHARONOT and AL HAMISHMAR. These stories recount some of the tribulations now being experienced by the bedouins of the al-Naqb desert, which constitutes the southern part of occupied Palestine.

It has been noticed recently that the Israeli authorities have intensified their acts of oppression against the bedouins following a plan to seize whatever lands these bedouins continue to have and to transform them into homeless refugees in their own homeland. Before we dwell on these Zionist plans, we must cast a historical glance at the social conditions of the al-Naqb bedouins.

On the eve of the 1948 catastrophe, the number of bedouins in al-Naqb amounted to nearly 100,000 people, of whom only 13,000 people belonging to 18 tribes remained in Palestine after the creation of Israel. The rest were driven away and became refugees in Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The Israeli authorities at the time tried to force all the bedouins to depart for Jordan and Egypt by resorting to brutal criminal methods, such as attacking their tents, killing some of them, opening fire on their herds and destroying their crops. When martial law was declared, a siege was

imposed on the bedouins, and the members of the various tribes were prohibited from visiting each other or leaving their territory for any other area without an official permit from the military ruler in Bi'r al-Sab'.

The Israel authorities also resorted to sealing off vast pasture areas and forcing several tribes, such as al-Sani', al-'Azazimah and al-Tarabin, to leave their lands for areas adjacent to the Jordanian border with the aim of tempting them to emigrate to Jordan. But the bedouins stood fast in the face of the Zionist oppression and tyranny and preferred to stay under occupation in Palestine rather than become refugees in Jordan. Thanks to the high birth rate characterizing the Palestinian Arabs generally, the bedouin population of al-Naqb has tripled. It is now believed that the number of bedouins ranges from 45,000 to 60,000 people [in al-Naqb].

Concerning the social conditions of Palestine's bedouins, nearly 30 percent of them work in agriculture, and the others have turned into manual workers in the Zionist environment. They work in construction, fruit harvesting, plants and other services. As indicated by statistics, the bedouins possess 65,000 head of sheep and 23,000 goats, in addition to several thousand head of cattle, camels and horses. This livestock is the mainstay of their life.

Throughout the past 30 years of occupation the Israeli authorities have resorted to keeping the bedouins in miserable and backward conditions. These authorities refuse to admit that the bedouins have rights. On the contrary, the Israeli politicians consider the bedouins "a security problem." This is why all the means of dealing with them are confined to the Israeli military ruler in Bi'r al-Sab'. As a result of this oppressive treatment, the majority of the tribes still lack drinking water and rely on inadequate artesian wells or bring water in tanker trucks from Bi'r al-Sab' daily.

On the other hand, the Israeli authorities have set up several schools for the children of bedouins. However, this step was not the result of an initiative by the Ministry of Education to raise the educational standard among the bedouins, but the result of secret agreements, between the then ruling party--the Mapai (Labor Party)--and the bedouin tribes. The schools were set up in return for a promise from the bedouin tribes to give their vote to this party in the Knesset elections. The truth is that the educational standard in these schools is very low. Each school consists of a wooden structure that contains three to eight rooms. Therefore, it is not surprising that the number of bedouins who have completed their elementary and secondary education does not exceed several hundred.

As for the plan to seize the lands belonging to the bedouins, the Israeli authorities have not acknowledged the bedouin ownership of the land since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. This is why these authorities began to confiscate tens of thousands of dunums to build agricultural

settlements and towns as part of the process of Judaizing al-Naqb. The Israeli government's policy has been inclined toward settling Jewish immigrants in al-Naqb. For example, the Israeli authorities confiscated a large part of the lands belonging to al-Hawashilah tribes to build the city of Duma in the 1950's. They confiscated nearly 40,000 dunums of the lands belonging to the Abu Rabi'ah tribe to build the town of (Arad) in the 1960's.

Thus, after several years of occupation the bedouins found their lands shrinking in the face of the encroachment of Jewish settlements. Despite their protests, they achieved no results. This is why they have been content to say: "The strong are shameless." Considering that the bedouins generally cannot read or write and that they do not record such events as marriages, divorces, births, deaths and sale and purchase transactions, all these deals are concluded verbally and sealed with a handshake. Considering also that the bedouins have been famous for refusing to acknowledge any authority, the Ottoman authorities used to pay large sums to the tribal chieftains in return for their pledge to maintain order. This is why the Israeli authorities decided to exploit this situation under which the bedouins have been living for hundreds of years with the aim of seizing their lands.

The first step the Israeli authorities took in this respect was to require the bedouins to pay a certain sum of money in return for permitting them to continue to cultivate their lands, on the pretext that bedouins own no land. When the bedouins strongly protested this tyrannical decision, the Israeli authorities claimed with utter stupidity: "We are a democratic country and our courts are impartial. Whoever claims that he owns land, he can sue the state. If a court rules in the plaintiff's favor, then we shall acknowledge his ownership of the land." In fact, all the bedouin tribes were faced with a dilemma as a result of this Israeli decision and the fact that no tribe had any land ownership deed. This is why the bedouins were forced to pay the Israeli authorities tenancy fees to be able to cultivate their own lands. The authorities used to lease the land for a period of only 8 months, because Ottoman law (and many Ottoman and British laws are still in force in Israel) stipulates that any individual who cultivates common land for 15 successive years will come to own this land. This is why the Israeli authorities resorted to filling this gap by leasing the land for a period of only 8 months every year.

What Does al'Arif Say

Some people may ask: Why didn't the bedouins register the land in their name in the courts during the period of Ottoman and British rule? The reasons are numerous, the foremost being the bedouins' ignorance of Ottoman law. The land law was promulgated in 1858. Moreover, the Ottoman authorities, and even the British authorities, left the bedouins alone. All that these authorities wanted from the bedouins was that they maintain order. Another reason is that the land registration process initiated by

the British authorities was begun in northern Palestine during the days of the mandate. The 1948 war did not permit this registration process to reach the southern lands. The proof of this fact is that there was no land registration bureau in Bi'r al-Sab'.

In this respect, 'Arif al-'Arif, author of the book "Bi'r al-Sab' and Its Tribes" and who also held the post of Bi'r al-Sab' district officer in the 1940's, says that if you ask a bedouin for proof of his ownership of a piece of land he is content to point to his sword, meaning that he is ready to kill or to die for his land. In the bedouin's belief, this is the biggest proof of ownership.

The bedouins avoided registering lands in their names in the past because such a step would have caused them problems, such as payment of taxes. Many Palestinian Arabs refused to register the land in their names because they considered that the British occupiers had no right to levy taxes. Moreover, the few bedouins who did register land in their names tended to register smaller tracts than they really owned so as to reduce the burden of taxes levied on the land.

The bedouins point out that the Jewish Agency did not ask them to show ownership deeds when it was buying the land from them during the British mandate and that this agency was content with their thumbprints on the sale papers and with the presence of two witnesses, as is the custom among the bedouins.

Despite their despair over the Israeli authorities' position and their awareness that courts cost enormous sums of money (especially since the Israeli authorities resorted to the method of postponing sessions, thus increasing the costs, because a lawyer's fees amounted to 1,000 Israeli pounds per session whereas a worker's wages amounted to nearly 100 pounds monthly), the bedouins sued the authorities 80 times, demanding that their right to the land be acknowledged. The authorities' reply was both funny and ridiculous at the same time. These authorities said that al-Naqb lands are common lands not owned and not cultivated by anybody. This law defined the common lands as vacant lands given to nobody and located at a distance from the nearest town or village whereby the shout of a man standing on the near side of the town or village cannot be heard. This ridiculous definition means the land located at a distance of 1 1/2 miles or half an hour's walk from the closest village or town. The gist of the matter is that the Israeli courts dropped all the cases brought up by the bedouins, who wound up with no land after losing thousands of pounds. This is why the bedouins now view the courts as a waste of time and as a door to bankruptcy.

Land Law

Considering that the Israeli authorities aspired to seize the Arab lands in Palestine, the Knesset in 1969 promulgated the Israeli land law, which

stipulates that all lands whose ownership is not proven shall be registered as state-owned lands (paragraph 22). The aim of this law is to save the state the trouble of suing the Arabs to prove that the land does not belong to them. In accordance with this law, all unregistered lands became state-owned lands automatically. In other words, the State of Israel need not prove its ownership of any land.

In its attempt to plunder the bedouin lands, Israel did not stop here. It came up with plans to urbanize the bedouins by building for them towns or villages near the Zionist settlements in order to supply these settlements with cheap labor. The first of these plans began in the early 1960's, when Gen Moshe Dayan was the minister of agriculture. Dayan's plan called for evicting the bedouins from al-Naqb and moving them to new villages near Lod and al-Ramlah. But the bedouins strongly opposed this plan, not because they do not prefer to live in modern homes but because they understood that the main goal of the plan was to seize their land. This is why the Israeli authorities were forced to abandon this plan and to draw up the provisions of a new plan.

The new Israeli plan called for gathering the bedouins in three residential centers in al-Naqb. Each center was to comprise 5,000 donums of land, and each family was to be given just half a donum, provided that the bedouins pay 1,000 pounds in costs and that the rest be paid as a 25-year loan with interest of 6.5 percent. The Israeli authorities did not even consult the bedouins on the project. They started to build the first village, called Tall al-Sab', 7 kilometers east of Bi'r al-Sab'. When registration for living in this village was opened, the results were disappointing to the Israeli hopes. Only 20 individuals expressed an interest in purchasing homes in this village.

When it became obvious to the Israeli authorities that the project in its entirety was a failure, the building activity was brought to a halt after only 50 homes, out of a planned total of 1,000, had been built. It is worth noting that those who bought homes in Tall al-Sab' were people who owned no land in the first place. When the Israeli authorities inquired about the lack of demand for this new village among the bedouins, the answer of the bedouins was that they do not object to the idea of living in modern homes but that they want the government to first acknowledge their ownership of the land, and they will then be ready to live in any place the Israeli Government wishes them to live.

The Israeli Government did not adjust its plans after this devastating failure. Rather, it intensified its pressures to force the bedouins to submit to its will. It took hundreds of people who had built tin shacks without license to the courts in Bi'r al-Sab' and levied fines on them. Moreover, orders were issued to destroy their shacks. The Israeli authorities also began to pursue herdsmen with the aim of expelling them from the areas to which they had been accustomed to take their herds for grazing. The government also threatened farmers who leased pasture lands to the

bedouins with economic sanctions, such as stopping aid to them, not increasing water allocations for them, etc.

Special military groups, called the green patrols, were formed under the pretext of environmental protection (?!). However, these patrols constantly assault and intimidate the bedouins. For example, these patrols last month attacked 8 shepherds from the Abu Rabi-ah tribe near the town of (Arad). Four of the shepherds were arrested, whereas the other four fled and informed their tribal chieftains of what had happened. When the chieftains rushed to the site of the incident, they found no trace of the shepherds or of the herds, which numbered 12,000 head of livestock. After a long search they found a small number of the herds 20 kilometers from the scene of the incident.

"Official" Campaign

The campaign against the bedouins is currently being led by two generals, namely, Abraham Yafi, the official in charge of environmental protection, and Gen Arik Sharon, the minister of agriculture. Both are from the Likud Bloc ruling Israel, a bloc which believes that the Arabs have no right to Palestine even if they have land ownership deeds. Generals Yafi and Sharon have given broad powers to the green gangs, such as the power to burn down tents, demolish tin shacks, arrest and beat shepherds, and scare people by firing over their heads and by throwing smoke bombs among their herds, in addition to destroying wells.

On the other hand, the Israeli Ministry of Interior also launched a campaign against the bedouins and considered them a fifth column working for the interests of a foreign country and receiving aid from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah. These accusations were made by (Vardimon), governor of the southern province. However, the bedouins did not succumb to the threats of the "green patrols" and of the Israeli Ministry of Interior. Hundreds of them went to Jerusalem to demonstrate before the Knesset and to present their case to world public opinion. Dr Yunis Abu Rabi'ah, one of the organizers of the bedouin demonstration in Jerusalem, told MA'SRIV: "The Israeli Government wants to resettle us in specific areas with the aim of seizing our lands and destroying our herds and of transforming us into workers in al-Naqb settlements and kibbutzim.

Last month the tribal chieftains held a press conference in Jerusalem in which they exposed the brutal methods used by the "green patrols." The Israeli Government dropped a proposal by the Mapam Party to discuss the issue of the confiscation of bedouin lands in the Knesset and was content to announce the formation of a committee under the chairmanship of Gen Abraham Yafi, the official in charge of the "green patrols," to look into the problems of the bedouins. As a result of the committee headed by Yafi, the Israeli authorities have encouraged the settlers to attack the bedouins. Last March more than 200 residents of (Petha) settlement, located near (Ovakim), attacked the home of bedouin Muhammad al-Rayyati and burned all

his tents, furniture and crops. The losses were estimated at 1 million Israeli pounds. The only sin committed by this bedouin is that he owns a piece of land that the settlement residents covet and that they have been trying to seize by force. The man was forced to ask the Israeli Supreme Court to issue a protective order banning the settlers from entering his land. However, the settlement residents have not obeyed the order and have taken revenge against the bedouin.

In 1974 the bedouins formed a committee to defend their lands. It was called the Bedouin Lands Committee and consisted of the bedouin chieftains and notables, led by Hammad Abu Rabi'ah and Musa al-'Atawinah. The goal of this committee was to negotiate with the Israeli Government to find a solution to the problem of land. The government formed an arbitration committee whose proposals were turned down. The proposals, in summary, acknowledge the right of the bedouins to 50 percent of the land if they can prove that they have been cultivating it constantly since the 1940's and provided that the bedouins be paid financial compensation for 30 percent of the land and that the government acknowledge their ownership of the remaining 20 percent of the land. For example, if it is proven that a bedouin owns 100 donums of land, the government wants him to cede 50 donums to it, to be paid a small financial compensation for 30 donums and to retain only 20 donums.

Bedouin Committee's Reply


The reply that the Bedouin Lands Committee sent to the office of the Israeli prime minister's adviser for Arab affairs said: "We still feel that this proposal is doing us an injustice and that it does not assure us of the minimum area of land necessary for our life and the life of our children and grandchildren after us, especially since you know perfectly well the nature of the lands concerned and their production capacity, and since you know that production relies largely on rainfall and climatic conditions and changes. We express our dissatisfaction with and our opposition to this proposal, especially since we don't know what the arbitration committees will decide in the future in regard to land ownership."

The Bedouin Land Committee's memorandum also said: "We have no objection to the government's setting up of villages for bedouins or for others who want to live in such villages of their own free will instead of living on the land we have been exploiting for generations and the land to which we are bound forever. There is nothing dearer to the bedouin than his land, and the bedouins should not be expected now or in the future to enter into negotiations aimed at ceding their ownership of the land."

It is worth noting that the bedouins are asking the Israeli Government to acknowledge their ownership of 900,000 donums of cultivable lands and 1 million donums of grazing lands. The area of land currently at the disposal of the bedouins is 200,000 donums. The rest has been sealed off to them or given to the Jewish settlements.

Since the bedouins submitted their proposals to the Israeli Government, there has been a change in authority and the Likud Bloc has assumed power in Israel. Instead of seeking a solution to the land problem, Begin's government has resorted to implementing a "strong-arm" policy in an attempt to intimidate the bedouins and force them to submit to its will.

the problem of the al -Naqb bedouins, about which the major world papers has reported recently, is a flagrant example of the arrogance of the Zionist settlement policy, which the bedouins will not allow to be implemented at the expense of their rights. They have already reminded the Israeli Government that the bedouins were in al-Naqb before the Jews came to Palestine. This is also what the Torah says.



Map of Area with High Bedouin Population

Key for Map:

- | | | |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Symbols | 11. Al-Ufnaysh | 21. To Hebron and Jerusalem |
| 2. Clan | 12. Al-'Uqabi | 22. Al-Asad |
| 3. Tribe | 13. Abu Rabi'ah | 23. Abu'Abdun |
| 4. School | 14. Nasasirah | 24. Bi'r al-Sab' |
| 5. Medical Clinic | 15. Abu Surayhan | 25. To Tel Aviv |
| 6. To (Arad) | 16. Abu Ghalyun | 26. To (Yeroham) |
| 7. Qudayrat al-Sani' | 17. Aub 'Amrah | 27. Al-'Azazimah |
| 8. Al-Qawa'in | 18. Abu Raqiq | 28. Al-A'sam |
| 9. Abu Bilal | 19. Aub Juway'id | 29. Tarrabin al-Sani' |
| 10. Al-'Atawinah | 20. To Demona | 30. Abu Quraynat |

ISRAEL

PAST EXPERIENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTRY'S NEW DIRECTOR GENERAL OUTLINED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 29 Aug 78 p 2

[Article: "New Director General of Foreign Ministry Has Past Association With Both Ministry and Foreign Minister"]

[Text] The new director general of the Foreign Ministry, Mr Yosef Chehanover, assumes office, bringing with him a past history unlike any of his predecessors. In the 4 years he headed the Foreign Ministry delegation to the U.S. he signed armament agreements in the sum of \$7 billion out of the total of \$9 billion purchased since the Yom Kippur War.

The period that Chehanover spent in New York was the natural corridor to the diplomatic world. It coincided with the reconstruction of the IDF after the Yom Kippur War, and was full of political ups and downs, which reached their climax in the reevaluation period of the summer of 1975. The need to struggle for renewed shipments of arms and new items on the list forced Chehanover to meet with the American Secretary of Defense and with heads of the Pentagon. In order to widen his base of support he cultivated contacts with senators and representatives. His house was open to heads of arms manufacturing companies, Jewish leaders and important correspondents.

The Pentagon itself recognized Chehanover's diligence and success and just prior to his departure he received a special citation from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, something which no other delegate head before him had received.

When Chehanover was nominated for director general of the Foreign Ministry he began to take part in political talks with officials of the White House and the State Department.

Like most director generals of ministries, Yosef Chehanover is "his minister's man." It is no secret that the position was offered to him last year, the day after Moshe Dayan became foreign minister in Begin's government. As much as the offer was tempting he could not accept it then since he was

just about to finish his studies for a doctoral degree in rabbinical law at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York. Only when he completed his studies and wrote his thesis did the 45 year old Chehanover accept the foreign minister's offer. He was just approved to replace Efrayim Evron as the director general of the Foreign Ministry, when the latter leaves for Washington to become the Israeli ambassador there.

Chehanover's acquaintance with Moshe Dayan has been a matter of a 20 year continuous relationship. Although at different times he worked with other ministers--such as Shimon Peres and Ezer Weitzman--his loyalty to his job was never in conflict with his loyalty to Moshe Dayan. His acquaintance with the foreign minister began when Moshe Dayan became agriculture minister in the coalition of the late David Ben-Gurion. Chehanover was then deputy legal adviser in the Agriculture Ministry. Soon he found a common language with Mr Dayan and his close adviser and aide, Member of Knesset Gad Ya'aqobi. Because of his skill and diligence he became legal adviser of the Ministry. When Dayan became defense minister on the eve of the Six Day War he "plucked" Chehanover and appointed him legal adviser of the defense system. In this capacity the young attorney acquired a wide range of experience, not only in the area of contracts but also in all other aspects related to the defense system, including subjects related to the treatment of Arabs in the territories.

Chehanover's close aide in the Defense Ministry is Eli Rubinstein, now his director. Mr Rubinstein accompanies the foreign minister on all his trips and participates in all discussions, even the most delicate ones.

Now that Chehanover comes to Jerusalem the circuit will be closed again and the trio Dayan-Chehanover-Rubinstein will be in control of the Ministry and will set its policies. The trio will call on some senior officials, as necessary; among them: political adviser Ehud Avri'el, who is in charge of cultivating contacts with countries with which Israel does not maintain diplomatic relations; legal adviser Dr Me'ir Rozen, who actively participates in all peace talks with Egypt and Naftali Lavi, who was also brought by Dayan from the Defense Ministry.

As one who has always been known for thoroughness and a serious approach to subjects under his control, Chehanover now devotes most of his time to studying the Ministry's problems and structure. He personally knows many of the Ministry's chiefs--some because they worked in the U.S., others because they were associated with subjects he dealt with. This fact makes his adjustment to the new job easier. But it is clear that after a certain "break-in" period Chehanover will be in a position to form his own ideas concerning the Ministry he heads and the type of work it performs. The new director general of the Foreign Ministry is no revolutionary,

neither is he captive to rigid, frozen frameworks. Therefore, those who know Chehanover do not doubt that if after some time he sees fit to recommend certain changes in the structure of the Ministry, he will not hesitate to do so. In this case he is bound to have the full support of the foreign minister.

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TUNISIA

LEADER OF AL-HURRIYAH INTERVIEWED ON TUNISIAN POLITICAL SCENE

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19-25 Jun 78 pp 16-18

/Text/ Interview with Messaoud Chebbi, leader of Al-Hurriyah, by Qusai Salih Darwish: "Time Propitious for Considering Unity Among Libya, Algeria and Tunisia; Unity in the Arab World Begins Not in Economics but in Politics; Ben Salah's Reservations About Multi-party System Give Impression He Is Still Attuned to Regime"; date and place not given/

/Text/ Paris.--One of the most important effects of the upheaval of 26-27 January in Tunisia is that it focused attention on the Tunisian left which in the past was, for objective and intrinsic reasons, on the periphery of events. But inasmuch as it highlighted the importance of the Tunisian left, the uprising also revealed its organizational shortcomings which occasionally reflect personal shortcomings that are not commensurate with objective maturity. And yet, events also brought out the importance of the progressive, nationalist trend in Tunisia--the trend which seeks to establish a link between the struggle for Arab unity and the tasks dictated by the present stage of the national revolution. In earlier editions, AL-DUSTUR tried to highlight this trend, beginning with an interview with the late Al-Tahir 'Abdullah. Within this context, Messaoud Chebbi talked to AL-DUSTUR. Chebbi, who is known for his struggle as a member of the Socialist Arab Ba'th party, is presently head of Al-Hurriyah, the organization of Tunisian democrats.

In keeping with the candor which characterizes the interviews conducted by AL-DUSTUR, discussion dealt with the most important issues in Tunisia now, beginning with the post-Bourguibist crisis down to the possibilities of an alliance with some segments of the Tunisian bourgeoisie which are at loggerheads with the regime.

/Question/ It is said that the Destourian (Bourguibist) regime is currently going through a crisis. Do you believe it is a crisis stemming from the vacuum which would be left by Bourguiba, as some say, or a logical result of the regime's natural evolution?

/Answer/ I believe that the regime's crisis has two aspects: one is circumstantial, relating to the transfer of authority, now that Bourguiba, who has tailored the regime to his own specifications, has reached an advanced age; the second is structural--that is to say that it is a crisis pertaining to the very structure of the regime. Since the late 30s, the regime has been adopting one strategy, namely, action to get rid of direct colonialism, while at the same time preserving the basic interests of Western imperialism. Bourguiba had designed that strategy in accordance with the following "givens":

One--that Tunisia should become independent of France by depending on its own intrinsic strength.

Two--Tunisia, given its population and geographical and economic size, cannot be really or fully independent. Hence the formula which governed the 1956 independence agreement (independence within a framework of interdependence with France). If we looked at those concepts, we find that they are realistic in terms of the needs and circumstances of that period. New radical changes began, however, to appear on a global scale and especially on the Arab scale in the early 50s. Despite that, Bourguiba continued to adhere to the old strategy because it was the most convenient for his regime. In 1950, the eastern camp no longer remained isolated in one corner of the world or remained primarily a propagandist and instigative power, but became a major and basic power which had to be reckoned with before anything could be done in the world. Furthermore, most of the Arab world at that time freed itself from direct colonialism and began to move into the zone of nonalignment and seek to effect social changes that were needed to solve the problems of the masses and to face up more firmly to imperialism. This was clearly demonstrable in Egypt and Syria and later in Iraq. The outbreak of the Algerian revolution posed the question of unifying the struggle in the Arab Maghreb. Bourguibism, however, ignored all these changes in the world and turned its back on the task of achieving complete independence from French imperialism and bringing about an Arab Maghreb unified through struggle. More than that, Bourguiba and his regime played an active role in impeding any attempt to this end. He exerted strong pressure on the Algerian revolution to reach a compromise with France, and participated in striking at the trends that were more opposed to imperialism and more desirous of unifying the Arab Maghreb as a prelude to a comprehensive Arab unity. Thus, he plotted against the revolutionary current in Algeria, mercilessly suppressed the Youssefist movement, which represented the overwhelming majority of the Tunisian masses, and terrorized Arabist views in Tunisia. Therefore, the reform attempts he had mounted in Tunisia, especially on the economic level, failed twice: the first attempt was made in 1969 in a progressive guise, whereby the state played the major role in the process of capital accumulation since Tunisian bourgeoisie was too weak to undertake the necessary investments; the second was begun in the 70s. It was, in sum, a blatant attempt to consecrate a capitalist system in Tunisia, but it too folded on 26 January, 1978, when the regime had to resort to practices of

suppression the country had not seen since the 19th century because it could no longer solve the basic problems of the people. There is an unemployment crisis, a housing crisis, a runaway high cost of living and an investment disability. To this may be added vast class distinctions.

Transfer of Power No Solution

/Question/ If the crisis, in both its circumstantial and structural aspects, is such, there are those who see two possible courses for the next phases, or the so-called post-Bourguibist phase. One, the crisis would lead a fascist military regime which would undermine the democratic structure Bourguibism had claimed as its own contribution. Two, conversely, there may be an attempt to bring in progressive elements in the bourgeoisie which are supported by Western circles, and forge a new phase which would be historically connected with Bourguibism. What do you think?

/Answer/ In view of the fact that the regime is facing two crises, it will surely be unable to solve its own crisis through the transfer of power from one hand to the other. In other words, the crisis will continue no matter who assumed power, because Tunisia, due to its geographic, political and economic size and in view of the current acute crisis of world capitalism which has been unable to come to the economic assistance of the Tunisian regime, cannot solve the problems of unemployment and the high cost of living etcetera in the framework of the Bourguibist strategy, which views Tunisia as a separate, self-contained nation. In this regard, Tunisia is a well-developed model of development carried out in a regional (as opposed to national) context. The Tunisian economy is choking today, because those running the government and their supporters are determined to go on closing the borders and steer clear of a pan-Arab strategy. Therefore, any trend which does not offer an alternative to the Bourguibist strategy will keep Tunisia mired in a social and economic crisis.

/Question/ This is as far as the real alternative needed to avoid a crisis is concerned. But what about the two suggested possibilities?

/Answer/ The danger of a possible turn for the worse, in the light of this analysis, will be there, whether Bourguiba remained or not. The question is no longer one of persons, but has become a question of an alternative and how to bring it about. We believe that a phony liberalism is incapable of solving the crisis. Likewise, the crisis cannot be solved through a military coup which is likely to be more fascist than the present regime if it did not offer an alternative to the obsolete Bourguibist strategy.

/Question/ What do you perceive the alternative strategy to be?

/Answer/ I alluded to that when I said that the present regime refuses to take a pan-Arab direction. It is not a question of perceiving a utopian strategy or alternative, but the alternative should be realistic.

and based on the facts of the modern age and the motivating forces in it. In other words, the needed strategy should have all the elements that would insure its applicability, whether domestically or on the Arab and international levels. Domestically, I believe that the basic social forces in the country, which are made up of the toiling forces led by the working class, have come to realize seriously that they cannot solve the country's problems through a regional (local) perspective. The Arab situation has also evolved, especially in the vicinity of Tunisia (Libya and Algeria), in such a way as to permit the consideration of a strategy which would bring together Tunisia's capabilities and potentialities with those of its neighbors. I say "consideration," because the situation calls for the articulation of a strategy which takes into account the obstacles and tasks and a phased approach. We believe, in other words, that the time has come to pose the question of unity in the Arab Maghrib politically, and to abandon the mistaken view that unity can be achieved through economics regardless of politics, or, to put it differently, that one has to start with economic unity then proceed to political unity. In the underdeveloped countries, the nationalist factor plays the major role in rearranging the sub-structure, not the other way round. Unity in the Arab world will not begin with an economic unity leading to a political one, but with a political unity leading to an economic one. Looking at the indices of trade and commercial relations in the Arab world, one readily sees that politics is undoubtedly the determinant of economic relations.

/Question/ Can this be achieved through the same social and political forces now represented by the Tunisian regime?

/Answer/ We believe that the regime, in its totality, cannot produce the will for such action. But it is surely possible that there will be parts of the regime which will agree to the alternative, since the regime itself, because of its political, social and geographic constraints as well as its associations with imperialism, cannot take this course. The biggest evidence of this was the (Jerba) agreement between Tunisia and Libya. Decisive forces emerged from within the Tunisian regime to deactivate the agreement. In this they were supported by their foreign connections.

/Question/ What, in your opinion, are the political symbols of those parts of the regime which would agree to the alternative?

/Answer/ The question, as we see it, is not so much the persons involved, but the position of such persons within the regime and their role in it. Thus, the persons who are closer to or more involved in power and who shoulder great responsibilities will be more opposed to the alternative in question and vice versa. The further away a person is from the center of power in the regime, the more sensitive he would be to the masses' demands for an alternative.

/Question/ And the class identification of such persons?

/Answer/ Their class identification does not exactly determine their attitude in this matter. Many segments of the national bourgeoisie may find it possible to accept the alternative because it does not clash with their interests.

From Disunity to Unity

/Question/ In the short run or the long run?

/Answer/ What matters is to think of the present conditions, because the process of evolution in the Arab world--that is to say, the transition from disunity to unity--will not be a short period. What we here call the democratic phase, that is the phase of transition from disunity to Arab unity, will take years, because the ingredients of unity will not mature suddenly and instantaneously, but through a chain of events and a chain of linkages--both among the masses and political systems--which lead ultimately to the unification of the Arab homeland. Only then will the bourgeoisie feel impending danger.

/Question/ In view of what you have just said, why then has the Arab bourgeoisie stood against all the serious unification attempts in the Arab homeland, beginning with the 1958 unity down to the (Jerba) agreement?

/Answer/ I believe that the so-called problematique of unity has not been given adequate study and consideration by the Arab unionists thus far. Consequently, I do not think that it is right to make absolute judgements with regard to the position of various classes toward unity. Even the 1958 unity was not given enough study to enable us to derive from it general principles about Arab unity. There is no doubt, however, that most segments of the ruling bourgeoisie, and even the petit bourgeoisie, once in power would take a negative attitude toward the question of unity. It should be mentioned here that the state per se, in a system of disunity, is a hindrance to unity, because regional states are inevitably connected with imperialism.

/Question/ Which state?

/Answer/ Any state. Accordingly, we can say that any regional state is anti-revolutionary and therefore opposed to the masses. All those groups which are associated with a regional state one way or the other are disinclined to unity. A major part of the Arab bourgeoisie's negative attitude toward Arab unity is due to its proximity to the regional state system.

/Question/ What is the solution then?

/Answer/ The solution lies in weakening the regional states by expanding the gambit of democratic freedoms in every Arab country and promoting the multiplicity of parties, trends and trade unions.

/Question/ Would that abolish the regionalism of a state?

/Answer/ It does not abolish it, but it would allow the masses to confront the state. This would lead to a state of equalization and, eventually, to a process of linkage among the masses across the borders. Of course, political democracy requires that during this democratic phase in the Arab homeland private capitalism should be maintained. Once these things become clearer and more understood, various sectors of the national bourgeoisie will find it more possible for them to adjust their attitude with regard to the question of unity.

/Question/ There are those who have reservations about the existence of an Arab or even a regional bourgeoisie.

/Answer/ One should not look at things through the perspective of the present situation alone, because the Arab world is witnessing the emergence of a strong capitalism, especially since the 1973 increase in oil prices. It is not unlikely that national Arab bourgeois sectors would emerge, especially through the transition of petit bourgeoisie into a higher stage of bourgeoisie. One should not, however, say with certainty that there is no national bourgeoisie. Indeed, there are some elements of such a bourgeoisie now, although they may be ineffective. In Tunisia, for example, when the foreign banks law was presented, it touched off strong opposition within the Parliament. Several sectors of the Tunisian bourgeoisie also take a negative attitude toward the 1972 law pertaining to export industries.

/Question/ Do I understand from what you're saying that you support the establishment of a front which would include some sectors of the Tunisian bourgeoisie which you consider to be national sectors?

/Answer/ This question leads in fact to a discussion of the phase of transition from the Bourguibist strategy to the alternative strategy. There has to be a transitional period, which we call the democratic phase. Before we can talk about alliances, we should talk about the tasks involved and consider how the implementation of these tasks would require certain alliances. We believe that departure from the Bourguibist regime requires the definition of a basic task which, when carried out, would engender the conditions that can make possible movement toward a more radical task. We believe that the present crisis besetting the regime will continue to be complicated by the regime's clinging to the dictatorship of the one-party system. Therefore, there can be no movement toward developing present-day Tunisia unless the one-party dictatorship is ended, because the one-party system has become an obstacle to the development of the country in the economic, political, cultural and social fields.

/Question/ There are some Tunisian political quarters which believe that such a task would help rescue the Destourian regime and that it is better, therefore, to let the crisis deteriorate to the point where a

new revolutionary stage springs forth and helps to undermine the present regime and establish a progressive regime of the masses.

/Answer/ We believe that this kind of thinking belongs to the category of mythical, not scientific, thinking. How could it be possible for us to imagine that letting the regime do what it likes will suddenly bring forth a progressive revolution?

/Question/ The point is that the deterioration of the crisis gripping the regime will create the proper conditions for a revolutionary action by the masses through which they could also be organized.

/Answer/ I believe that we have seen action by the masses on more than one occasion. The problem was that the means of placing this action within its proper framework and leading it toward its objectives were missing. Of course, such means require democracy or something close to it, because the suppression practiced by the regime for 20 years now has prevented the growth of movements with mature ideas and wide-scale organization. Accordingly, we feel that the conditions for effecting real change in the country are there, but that what is missing is what may be called the intrinsic element, that is the conscious political organization of the masses. The organizational process requires a minimum degree of the freedoms which cannot be exercised under oppressive conditions. What I want to say here is that a period of democracy in which the left is nevertheless not in power is a period which strengthens, not weakens, the left.

The National Charter

/Question/ Specifically, what is your movement's position on the national charter announced by Ahmed Mestiri after his last meeting with President Bourguiba late last summer?

/Answer/ We have defined our position as follows: We announced our willingness to meet with any side which demands party freedom in Tunisia. We made this issue a criterion for any such meeting because we believe that any call for the freedom of parties in Tunisia will be of advantage to the people's masses, especially the working class, even if some sides abandoned the call later. We have no illusions about this, especially after the regime struck at the workers' movement. Accordingly, we sent a cable to Ahmed Mestiri, following his press statement in which he advocated the right of all trends and currents to exist freely, in which we defined our attitude and position on the subject and offered to discuss the points on which we and the government differ.

/Question/ Do you believe that Mestiri's "national charter" is more advanced than Ahmed Ben Salah's five-point program toward which you adopted a negative attitude?

/Answer/ We have entered into relationships and negotiations with the People's Unity since 1975 with the aim of forming a Tunisian opposition front. This would have materialized, since we had also formulated a joint statement with the Tunisian communists which was to announce the formation of a preparatory committee for an opposition front. We were taken by surprise, however, when the People's Unity withdrew at the last moment. The same group also expressed reservations about the idea of a multi-party system and began to make contacts with some elements of the regime, which led us to believe that the People's Unity has changed its position and begun to turn toward the regime. We believe that the "five points" laid forth by Ben Salah after that were in the same direction, that is they were oriented toward the regime, especially since those points contained no demand for the freedom of a multi-party system, and simply referred to the freedom of establishing trade unions. This led us to make public our clear-cut position on this orientation toward the regime--an orientation which we thought would lead to nothing but an ingathering of the dissenters. Of course, we believe that this is a step backward for Tunisia. The temptation may still be there today for Mestiri's group, and it would not be surprising if it should manage to lure them so that they may win the sympathy of the regime. But if the group slips, it will become a prey in the hands of the regime and it will stop playing a role which may be beneficial to the country, namely, the role of pushing the country forward toward a real democracy, not a bourgeois democracy for the angry wings of the regime.

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CSO: 4402

TUNISIA

ATTEMPTS TO OUST PSD DIRECTOR FROM TUNISIA DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19-25 Jun 78 pp 18,19

/Article by AL-DUSTUR's Paris correspondent: "A New Attempt To Get Sayah Out of Tunisia; Farhat Brothers in the Balance; PSD Director Competes With the Prime Minister in Building Bridges With Wassila"/

/Text/ According to reports from Tunisia, important changes in the government and the party leadership may occur, probably before the forthcoming PSD congress, following the intensification of the behind-the-scenes struggle between Prime Minister Hedi Nouira and PSD director Mohamed Sayah. AL-DUSTUR had reported earlier on this struggle and had noted in the edition before the last that Hedi Baccouche was appointed advisor to Nouira with regard to preparations for the forthcoming congress. The appointment was seen as a direct challenge to Sayah, especially since Baccouche is considered to be one of his bitter enemies.

It seems that Hedi Nouira has managed in recent weeks to score some points to his advantage after all signs were showing that Sayah was the major beneficiary of the turn of events in Tunisia, especially after his success in driving a wedge between President Bourguiba and his wife Wassila and in ousting former Interior Minister Tahar Belkhodja, considered to be close to Wassila Bourguiba and Nouira as well, his success in liquidating the trade unionist organization during the events of 26-27 January and, finally, his success in bringing back Habib Bourguiba Jr to the political forefront and in grooming him to replace Nouira at the head of the government as a first step toward succeeding his father in the presidency. The Tunisian Constitution designates the prime minister as the head of state ad interim throughout the legal period in which a head of state may be absent.

In achieving his successes, Mohamed Sayah depended on two factors: 1) His special affinity with Bourguiba, especially his ability to feed the great struggler's ego by drumming up the history of modern Tunisia and the accomplishments of Bourguibism or by talking Bourguiba into having his son succeed him so that the name, heritage and accomplishments of the great

struggler may be maintained. 2) His alliance with 'Abdallah Farhat, minister of defense, and his brother Mohamed Farhat, prosecutor general of the Tunisian republic.

In addition to these two factors, Sayah's success was also facilitated by the man's dynamism in organizing his supporters within the party machinery and his encouragement of regional and provincial prejudices. Sayah's major weakness, however, is that he does not enjoy the support of any foreign circles. While Hedi Nouria succeeded in securing France's absolute support, Ahmed Mestiri managed to win a large measure of American support. Furthermore, Sayah has in the last few years earned the hostility of Algeria and Libya. He has recently recognized this drawback, however, and has begun to actively seek America's support. He has also sought Saudi Arabia's good offices by sending Bourguiba Jr on several trips to the Gulf for this purpose. All these attempts, however, produced no positive results. It is said in Tunisia that Sayah maintains secret relations with Czechoslovakia and that such a connection may open the door of Soviet support for him. But this is no easy matter in view of the fact that Sayah has antagonized all the patriotic and progressive forces in Tunisia and played a part in cracking down on them and eventually liquidating them. It would be difficult for the Soviets to overlook this and to defy Tunisian public opinion by lending their support to Sayah.

They Sensed the Predicament

It appears that the brothers Farhat perceived all these facts and recognized the fix entailed in a partnership with Sayah, particularly now that it has become clear that outside factors will determine the fate and shape of the new regime in Tunisia--primarily, the French position and, to a lesser degree, the Algerian-Libyan position. They have thus begun to disengage themselves from their alliance with Sayah and to accept the open-door principle advocated by Nouria. More than that, it is being said that there is an attempt to remove Sayah from the political arena in Tunisia and to send him away as ambassador in Geneva. Sayah had once before been banished to this post at the request of the then Prime Minister Bahi Ladgham. The report (about Sayah's appointment as ambassador in Geneva) seems to be more than just a rumor. The independent newspaper AL-SABAH and the French-language LE TEMPS have published a list of new diplomatic appointments in the Tunisian foreign service. It was noted that five ambassadors who were removed met with Ahmed Mestiri during his recent Arab and international tour. It was also noted in the list that the position of ambassador in Geneva remained vacant. However, the official newspaper AL-'AMAL denied the report the next day and called it a mere fabrication. AL-SABAH and LE TEMPS retorted by saying that the report they published was not official news but merely an opinion based on reliable information.

Well-informed sources say that Hedi Nouria has managed in recent times to drive Bourguiba Jr away from Mohamed Sayah and to persuade President Bourguiba of the merits of that. Nouria's argument was that Sayah would not settle for less than being the absolute ruler of Tunisia, that his fellowship with Bourguiba Jr is expedient and temporary, whereas Nouria's approach is one of maintaining alliances and balances within the regime which would enable Bourguiba Jr to stay on. It seems that this reasoning may also determine the positions of the Farhat brothers. Such a change in the political map of the Tunisian regime may also drive Mohamed Sayah to rebuild the disrupted bridges with Wassila Bourguiba on the assumption that she would not agree to being in the same camp with Bourguiba Jr. According to information which leaked out, Sayah has in fact sent an emissary to Paris to intercede with Wassila Bourguiba, but this report remains unconfirmed. It is unlikely, however, that Mrs Wassila would accept such a reconciliation for the following reasons: 1) The enmity between Sayah and Wassila is deep-rooted, and it would be difficult to simply forget the intensity it has reached, especially in the past phase. 2) Wassila does not trust Sayah because she also knows that Sayah would not agree to having partners in power. 3) Her friendship with and alliances within the camp of Hedi Nouria are stronger. Also, a reconciliation between her and Mestiri is not unlikely, particularly since more than one personal and objective factor encourages such a reconciliation. 4) Wassila will not abandon Masmoudi, for the present time at least, due to many factors.

Does this mean, then, that Mohamed Sayah will give up? Those who know him well discount such an eventuality and say that he is willing to die in Tunisia rather than accept defeat, particularly since his departure from Tunisia this time would be final and there will be no return for him as there was the last time.

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WESTERN SAHARA

POLISARIO DELEGATION APPRAISES RECENT MAURITANIAN DEVELOPMENTS

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 14 Aug 78 pp 30-31

/Interview with (Habiballah 'Ali and Ballan Mohamed), POLISARIO officials, by Sawsan Shannar: "We Are Ready for Settlement That Guarantees to Our People Freedom and Self-Determination"/

/Text/ After the military coup which took place in Nouakchott and the quick successive developments that followed it, especially in regard to the positions and statements of the governments of Mauritania, Morocco, France and Algeria, as well as the statements of the Sahara Government representatives, AL-HURRIYA correspondent met with a delegation of the POLISARIO /Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia El Hamra and Rio de Oro/ consisting of brothers (Habiballah 'Ali and Ballan Mohamed), and the following was conducted:

/Question/ What is the Popular Front's evaluation of the recent changes in Mauritania?

/Answer/ The POLISARIO and the Sahara people have not been surprised by what has happened because it is a very axiomatic and natural development and a harvest for what the toppled Mauritanian ruler planted and for his embroiling Mauritania in a war between the two fraternal peoples in the Western Sahara. The coup was preceded by deterioration in the economic and social situation and by worker and popular strikes and demonstrations which spread throughout Mauritania protesting and condemning the unjust and the illegal war launched against the Sahara people, in addition to the control by the Popular Liberation Army forces on this arena and the impact of such control on the Mauritanian situation. It is well-known that the Mauritanian economy's backbone is the exportation of iron to the outside world through a 640-kilometer long railroad, which was an almost constant target of the strikes of the Popular Liberation Army which nearly caused a complete stop to Mauritania's iron exports.

The new Mauritanian leaders overthrew the treacherous president and his government. The Mauritanian people have been against the buried regime,

and the people's will has reflected its rejection and opposition to the war. The war launched against our people is rejected by the fraternal Mauritanian people. The Mauritanian people have always been a very important rear base for our people in their struggle against the Spanish occupation and against the treacherous plot and ill-omened agreements, such as the tripartite agreement of 14 November.

/Question/ What is the goal behind the cease-fire on the part of the Front alone, and is it conditional?

/Answer/ The POLISARIO cease-fire decision is unconditional, and it has been made to give the new Mauritanian rulers a golden opportunity to reconsider their position and to facilitate achieving the goal they declared in their first communique, namely "stop war and achieve peace." We believe that peace will be achieved by giving our people their right to determine their future and their independence. For Mauritania to achieve economic prosperity, security, stability and peace, it must back down on its previous plan and previous stances, which have been hostile to our people.

The cease-fire was a well-studied and responsible position on our part, and we actually consider it a political contribution to persuade the new rulers and the National Salvation Military Committee in Mauritania to back down on what agent Ould Daddah was doing against our people, because we believe, as martyr El Wali said, that every drop of blood shed from our people is a plot and treason against the two fraternal peoples in the Western Sahara and in Mauritania, considering the numerous factors that bind us and considering the historical asset which has been an asset of a struggle that united us in the war against the Spanish and French colonialism for long years.

/Question/ What are the possibilities of a peaceful settlement for the conflict and what is your position vis-a-vis the latest French proposal in this regard?

/Answer/ We are a popular movement that includes all the social groups. We can never be against a peaceful settlement. But what settlement and on what basis? We are ready to accept a settlement that is not in conflict with our people's aspirations for freedom, independence and self-determination.

The Sahara people demonstrated their right to self-determination and independence by declaring the Democratic Sahara Arab Republic in 1976. France has become a party through its direct military intervention on the side of the Moroccan and Mauritanian forces and against our people. This is a well-known matter. The truth about its forces--the /French/ commando forces that are now present in Mauritania and Senegal--is well known. Yet, we welcome any change in the French position that would be compatible with the common interest and with mutual respect and not with the logic of the spheres of influence, of military force and of flagrant exploitation.

/Question/ What is your evaluation of the future developments in Morocco
/sic/?

/Answer/ After 3 years of an unjust and a very costly war, there has been a change in the mentality, awareness and social reality in Morocco. The king has mobilized more than 60,000 troops in an unjust war against our people. There are reports and an almost general conviction that Morocco has lost at least 20,000 people who have been killed, wounded or disabled by the war. This has also been followed by deterioration in the economic situation. It has become obvious since devaluation of the dirham and since the increase in the taxes levied on the citizens that the Moroccan economy is in a bad state. The Moroccan regime tried in 1975 to demonstrate some kind of national consensus regarding invasion of the Western Sahara. However, the present positions of the Moroccan forces in the Saguia El Hamra are defense positions. The Moroccan people's problem cannot be solved through the annexation of territories, through military adventures or through aggression on one of the area's peoples. The problem is a problem of a monarchic regime, of social justice, of equality and of a fair distribution of the Moroccan national resources which are now concentrated in the hands of a very small group of wealthy people and of foreigners who have lived in the country for a long time. The Moroccan regime has often tried since the military adventure in the Western Sahara to convince the people that the danger threatening them comes from the Sahara, whereas the real threat and the cause of the suffering, the pain, the injustice and the darkness is the feudalism enemy and the monarchic regime that seizes the lands of the peasants, that suppresses the unionist demands of the workers, that requires, in the 20th century, dealing with tribes and with tribal chieftains, and that exerts active efforts to create regional conflicts between the cities so that it may continue to rule. The objective and intrinsic conditions are in favor of a Moroccan revolution. The 60,000 Moroccan troops mobilized for an unjust war may be the vanguard of this revolution in Morocco.

/Question/ What is your visualization of the future development of the conditions in the area as a whole?

/Answer/ I believe that the cause of tension and instability in the area is the unjust war launched against the Sahara people in defiance of their will and of the resolutions of international organizations, especially the resolutions concerning the liquidation of colonialism. This is why we are now facing a new situation after the developments which we consider the outcome of an unjust war. Two likely developments emerge in the area:

1. Facing the responsibility of restoring the conditions to what they were in 1975, i.e. putting a stop to the unjust war against our people, pulling out the military forces from all our people's territories, abiding by the will of our people and of the international organizations on self-determination and independence--an independence bolstered by our people's

intrinsic power and by the control of the Popular Liberation Army over the military areana. Another assisting factor is the will of the area's peoples for peace and stability.

2. More monarchic intransigence and continuation of the policy of expansion and of building an imaginary empire. This may burn everything, i.e. it may touch off a widespread war. Naturally, the real national forces in Algeria, the Western Sahara and Mauritania will not be responsible for this.

/Question/ What is your opinion of the OAU /Organization of African Unity/ resolutions and the nonalignment conference resolutions on the Sahara?

/Answer/ We consider the OAU resolution a new victory not only for our people but also for the OAU.

The resolution on our people's right to self-determination is an open victory for our people's struggle, a defeat for the expansionist ambitions of the Moroccan monarchic regime and another confirmation of solidarity with our people's just struggle from Africa's leaders.

The adoption of this resolution by the nonalignment foreign ministers confirms the degree of sympathy and solidarity gained by the Sahara people's cause in the world. This is another victory for our people's just struggle on the path of freedom and national independence.

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END